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EMIL BRUNNER ARD HIS IDEA OF •CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY• 
(Outline) 
111 
Controlling Purn1ae·: To investigate and ori tioize Emil Brunner•s idea o •Christian philosophy.• 
Introductionl . 
A brief hiatorioal survey of the conflict between 
reaso~ and revelation culminating in Barth and Brun-
ner of the Dialectical School. 
I. Brunner•s Theological Development. 
A. Brunner•s early history. 
B. Those to whom he 1s principally •indebted. 
0. The three periods in his life and writings. 
1. The period of criticism (1924-1928). 
a. The period of conflict (1928-1937). 
a. The con£1iot with Barth. 
b. The conflict with the Oxford Group. 
3. The period of personalism (1938 --). 
D. The definition of terms. 
1. Dialectical theology. 
a. Crisis theology. 
E. The scope of this investigation. 
II. Brunner•s Idea of "Christian Philosophy.a 
A. The statement of his idea of •Christian philosophy.n 
1. Why Christian philosophy is a fact. 
a. Brunner's three uses of reason. 
3. A dualism in this matter of revelation and 
reason. 
4. Reason is not evil,. al. !.I.• 
a. Therefore the problem is one of •defin-
ing the si>llere of reference.• 
b. Or it is the problem of the •specialist. 0 
5. The •1aw of the closeness of relation." 
a. The statement of the law. 
b. The history of the law. 
6. The •1aw of the closeness of relation• applied 
to certain fields. (The Christian philosopher 
in action.) 
a. The State 
b. CUlture. 
aa. Science. 
bb. Art and education. 
7. Brunner•s tw~ conclusions toward achi~ving a 
solutlon to the pr·oblem of Christian philos-
ophy. 
a. The break between revelation and reason accord-
ing to Brunner occurs not between theplogy 
and philosophy, but already between faith 
and theology. 
a. This transition is accomplished only at 
the risk of one's life. 
b. Therefore, the Christian philosopher 
must always return to the Word. 
9. The Christian can and must take an active 
part in the world. 
a. The Ohristian•s reason ha.a been set free 
by faith. 
b. Catastrophic events have demonstrated 
the urgent need for Christian philosophers. 
B. Criticism of Emil Brunner1s idea of •Christian phi-
losophy~• 
1. It is difficult to criticize Brunner. 
2. Brunner has much of great value and signifi-
cance to say. 
3. The Lutheran teaching as regards the use of 
reason and philosophy. 
a. Luther and the Lutheran Oonfeseions. 
b. 'l'he Lutheran dogmaticians. 
aa. Theolog'J' merely above. not con-
trary to reason and philosophy. 
bb. 'l'he •pure• and •mixed• art-iales. 
4. 'l'he value of Brunner•a •1aw of the closeness 
of relation.• 
5. This law can, however, be misleading. 
6. Where we must break with Brunner completely. 
a. For him the break between· revelation 
and reason occurs between faith and the-
ology, not between theology and philosophy. 
b. For us the break will ever occur between 
theology and philosophy. 
7. Why for Brunner the break must occur already 
between faith and theology. 
a. He uses reason and philosophy in his the-
ology in deciding just what is the Word. 
b~ His basic dialectic~l approach is phi-
losophical. 
III. Brunner•a Principle of •Truth as Encounter." 
A. This is our principal objection to Brunner. 
B. Brunner•s main exposition of this theme is found 
in The Divine-Human Encounter. . 
o. The history of the Object-Subject antithesis. 
1. The Greeks. 
a. The Roman Catholics. 
3. The Period o~ Subjectivism. 
4. The Reformation. 




D. The solution. 
l. I .t 1a not found betwee.n the two extremes. 
a. It is found beyond t~e •xtremea in •truth 
as encounter.• 
E •. Why we object to BZUDDer•a •-truth as encounter• 
·theme. 
1. The Bible does DO~ esse.ntially define •117 
concept of ·truth or fai~h. 
a .. Brunnerts definition .of truth or faith ls 
derived philos~phically from: . 
a. Kierkegaard'~ ez,iatential philoaop~ •. 
b. Martin Buber's nz-Thou• philos~phy. 
F. Brunner has again introduced philosophy i~to his 
theology and in doing so ha.a violated h1s o~ law. 
o. Conclusion: Brunner lacks the child-like faith 
of a Samuel. · 
EbiIL BRUDNER AND HIS IDEA OF •CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY• 
Introduction 
Philosophy, 1t can truthfully be said, has been a pro-
verbial thorn 1n the side of the Christian Church since the 
Church's inception some nineteen hundred and fifty years ago. 
Christ Himself had to entang1e with it when Be encountered 
the Sadducees, and Bis awareness of the perpetual Armaged-
don between the wisdom of men and the wisdom of God is con-
tained in His prayer: •1 thank thee, 0 Father, Lord of heav-
en and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise 
and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.•1 · St. Paul 
saw philosophy raise its ug1y head among his beloved Corin-
thians and he minced no words in warning them that •the wis-
dom of this worll is f ooliahness with God. 113 • When Epaphraa 
brought the report that the Ooloasians were being enticed by 
philosophy's fond allurement, Paul sounded the alarm: Beware 
lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, 
l. Luke 10:21 and Matthew 11:25,26. 
a. I Corinthians 3:19. 
1 
after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the 
world and not after Obrist.•3 
a 
But that was only the small beginning. Apostolic 
Fathers au.ch as Ignatius, Clement and Pa:pias., who expounded 
Christianity around the end of the first century were thor-
oughly tainted with philosophical nQtions. Indeed, Clement's 
view of the relation between Christ and the Church did not 
.differ essentially from that of the Gnostic Valentine. fhe 
Greek Apologists who followed were so saturated with Btoio 
and Philonio ideologies that for most-of them Christianity 
was little more than the highest philosophy. Justin (b. 
ca. 100) spoke as a true representative of that school when 
he said: •x found this philosophy alone (Christianity) to 
be safe and profitable.•4 Origin (d. 354) was as much a 
philosophical idealist as an orthodox traditionalist. ltuch 
more successful in breaking away from the adhesive tentacles 
of Greek and Judaistic thought were Tertullian (d. oa. 230), 
Irenaeus (d. ca. 202) and particularly Athanasius (d. 370). 
Yet notable vestiges of the foreign element remained eveQ 
in their thinking, speaking and writing. NoD was St. Augus-
tine (b. 354) completely victorious in shaking off that 
philosophical indootri~ation which had characterized the 
educatio~ of his youth. And thus the struggle continued. 
By the time Anselm (d. 1109) appeared on the scene, the 
3. Oolosaians 2:8. 
4. E. H. notsohe, A History At Christian poctr\ne, P• 4. 
3 
thorn of philosophy had become firmly embedded in theology's 
aide. Being constantly pricked, rubbed, irritated and never 
cleanly cut away, it bad created 'for itself a calloused, 
impenetrable cyst. It had become such a pa.rt of the main 
body of theological thought that Anselm and the rest of the 
Schoolmen culminating in the mental son of Aristotle, Thomas 
Aquinas (d. 1274), accepted it unheeitatingly with the whole 
body of Ohristian doctrine. They did worse than that. These 
metaphysicians attempted to strengthen the whole body with 
.the diseased portion. They strove to bolster up Scripture 
with Aristotle. That briefly is the story of how the con-
flict came to cease officially within the confines of the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
But the peace was more apparent than real: The Armaged-
don between philosophy and religion, between reason and rev-
elation was destined to brea,k out again with unexcelled fury. 
M&.rtln Luther was responsible for that and in the terrific 
battles he waged against the unification of Ohriatianity 
with philosophy, he came to loathe the Stagirlte with an 
aversion expressed by him in strong terms like: •the blind, 
heathen master Aristotle," •this wretched man• and •rancid 
teller of fables." Even so Luther always maintained that 
there was a measure of value in the study of philosoph,.S 
and even some good in Aristotle. Almost at the same time 
5. Of. Luther, Works !lf. Martin Luther, Holman Edition, 
Vol. II, pp. 146ff. 
4 
0alvin and Uelanchton wrestled seriously with the problem 
of philosophy versus Christianity. Toward the end. of the 
seventeenth century a forceful fifth column began to in-
vade Protestant theology commencing with "the Father of 
Deiem, 11 Lord Herbert Oherbury (d. 1648) cf England.. His 
ranks Nere soon swelled with the addition of such influ-
entials as John Locke and David Hume. • Deism and scepti-
cism abetted the rising tide of rationalism articulated in 
its earlier stages by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (d. 1716). 
in his Theodice. 'l'h1s work \Vas basically an attempt to dem-
onstrate the agreement of reaso~ with faith. Leibniz had 
an able ally in Sernler of Halle (d. 1791), who is kno111n a.a 
''the Father of German Rationalism. 11 Things went frOL'l bad 
to worse ~1th the propagandizing of Kant'• metaphysics of 
ethics and his purely rationalistic morality as the end of 
life. In opposition to the frigid Xantian school, Herder 
(d. 1803) and Jacobi (d. 1819) propagated their philoso-
phies of feeling and experience as the only basis for re-
ligion. Thus they prepared the way for Schleiermacher (d. 
1834) who, though he claimed to have banished philosophy 
from theology, constructed a curious, contradictory system 
of monism and due.lism, idealism and realism, rationalism · 
• 
and mysticism, natur ilism and supernaturalism, theism and 
pantheism, all in turn grounded on experience. 6 After 
6. E. H. Klotche, M• cit., p. 314. 
Hegel's (d. 1831) synthesis of theology and philosophy, 
Feuerbach1 s (d~ 1872) atheistic naturalism, Strauss1 s (d. 
1874) heralding of Darwinianism and Ritschl1 a humanistic, 
Neer.,.Kantian ethics, philosophy had so subdued and razed 
thristian theology that in practically. all Europe the strug-
gle between reason and revelation had ended. There was no 
further enemy left to fight. ilhat was left of true Christ-
ianity had so retracted into its own protective shell that 
little opposition could come from there. ~an didn't any 
longer have to rely upon the fanciful mrths and the naive 
God of Christianity. Being a god in himself he was becoming 
progressively better and would eventually effect his om sal-
vation through his natural reason and understanding. There 
iVas, of course, a vast difference between this cessation of 
hostilities and that of the Scholastic period. The Scholas-
tic thinkers recognized revelation as valid and made it their 
starting point in their theological system. They employed 
philosophy only secondarily. Nineteenth century thought, 
however, commenced aith sheer philosophy and in most oases 
vehemently denounced revelation or politely forgot about it. 
Thomism was a harm6nization of philosophy _with religion; 
liberalism was "8. ~armtnization of religion with philosophy. 
It took two florld Ware to upa~t the great scheme of 
human deification and send the liberals hurrying and scurry-
ing hither and thither like a bunch of frightened, disillu-
sioned rodents seeking escape from a ~urning harvest barn. 
Renovated and more conservative systems moved in to take over. 
John f. Clelland spoke of thts re~rkable reaction quite 
ably in a recent review in The Jestminster Theological imar_-
Readers of ·the Journal are well aware that the 
older liberalism with its immanentistic theology, 
its optimistic view of me.n, its activist.le depre-
ciation of doctrine and its cheerful faith that we 
could 'build Jerusalem in England's green and plea-
sant land' io no longer the fashion even in America 
which tends to lag behind in its adaptation of new 
theological styles. It has been oupplante~ by the 
Dialectical Theology of Darth and Brunner. 
Dialectical Theology has renewed the age-old conflict 
betv,een pbilosophy and Christianity. This new theology 
does contain many orthodox elements, however it definitely 
has not succeeded in eliminating all strains of liberalism. 
It is as ironical as it is true that the struggle is at the 
present time being waged most intensely in the very domain 
of the Dialectical School between the two most predominant 
fisurea: Barth, of the University of Basle, and Brunner, of 
the University of Zurich. Professor Brunner recognizes that 
philosophy has a destinotive, though limited, place within 
the schen,e of Christian doctrine and action, while Barth 
loudly and unrelentingly decries any attempt to put philos-
ophy in the employ of theology. 
Of the two Brunner appears at the present time to be 
more widely known £~nd received than Barth. John McCreary 
7. John P. Clelland, •A Review of Brunner•a Revelation 
§:!!!l.Reafon,• in .fhl. neytminster Theological Journal, Vol. X, 
No. 1, November, 1947, p. 57. 
., 
is right in his observation: •whatever may be the final 
outcome in this historically significant debate , it can 
hardly be doubted that in the Anglo-American minds Brun-
ner has found more receptive attitudes for his position 
than Barth has for his.•8 The very reason why Professor 
Brunner has found more sympathetic minds in the Anglo-
American scene is this that the average theologian of Brit-
ain and America still bears a. distinctly liberalistic hue, 
a~d consequently finds it difficult to reconcile his sys-
' tem with the ultra-dialectic, philosophy-intolerant, ab-
solute transcendentalism of Karl Barth. On the o~ber hand, 
Brunner•s immanent transcendentalism allows a little some-
thing for man to exercise his rationalistic gums on, and 
therefore carries a spirit much more akin to his own. Per-
haps this is also why Dr. Brunner is often referred to by 
the strict Barthians as •the Melanchtonian interpreter of 
Barth. 119 
It is impossible to measure the effect of the First 
~,orld ~~r on the theologians who had embraced optimistic 
liberalism, and the case of Emil Brunner is no exception. 
His whole theology has undergone a tremendous evolution 
fr~m an optimistic, soc.ial humanism to a pessimistic semi-
orthodoxy. The World Cataclysm of 1914-18 brought about 
8. John McCreary, •Brunner the Theological Mediator,• 
in Christendom, Vol. XII, No. a, (Spring, 1947), p. 186. 
9. Vergilius Ferm, •Brunner•s Theology of Crisis," in 
The Lutheran Church prterlY. Vol 3, (July, 1930), p. 322. 
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the greatest single change 'in Brunner•s development, but it 
was only the beginning. As late as 1938-39, upon being in-
vited to lecture at Princeton Theological Seminary, he wrote 
a frank letter to President Mackay in which he stated that 
even 1935 was ancient history in his theological evolution 
and intimated that he had abandoned positions of that by-
gone era, positions which denied the trustworthiness and 
historicity of the Holy Goapels.10 In the following I 
shall attempt to trace in greater detail the intriguing 
development of Brunner•s life and thought. 
10. Donald G. Barnhouse, •some Questions for Professor 
Brunner,a in The Presbyterian, Vol. OVIII, No. 18, (May 5, 
1938), p. e. 
9 
I. Brunner•a Theological Development 
Emil Brunner, the famous Swiss theologian, -was born in 
Winterthur, Switzerland, on December 23, 1889. Like Luther 
before him, Dr. Brunner proudly returns to the roots of bis 
life and says: •I am deeply rooted in the Swiss soil, for 
my people lived as farmers in the canton of Zurich for cen-
turies.•11 However, his father was a teacher of Bible and 
religion in the public schools, and be is said to have per-
formed his task so well that neither Jews nor Catholics ob-
jected. Again like Martin, Emil had a devout mother who 
taught hirn the truth and reality of God by the time he was 
three years old, so he declares. 
About this time his parents moved to Zurich and there, 
at the tender age of four, Emil saw his first social preach-. . 
er in the form of Christoph Blumhardt (1842-1919), son of 
the not~ble Johann Christoph Blumhardt (1805-1880), and lead-
er of Social Democracy. Brunner even to this day acknow-
ledges that the spirit of these great men who united spirit-
ual poNer with social passion are at athe very roots of my 
life. 1112 His second leader of religious socialism, Herman 
Kutter, whose niece he later married, Brunner came to know 
11. Dale Moody, •An Introduction to Emil Brunner• in ,nst 
Review J!:.!!.4. Expositor, Vol. XLIV, No. 3, (July, 194?J, p. 312. 
13. Ibid. 
10 
while 1n high school. It was this great philosopher and 
scholar, reader of Plato and the Church fathers in the orig-
inal, and renowned preacher, who catechized young, impres-
sive Emil. It is he whom the ~hite-h•irad Dr. Brunner 
still reverences with the words: "He we.a the greatest man 
I have ever met in my life.•13 · But student Brunner was 
yet to becon1e acquainted with the very founder of Religious 
Socialism in Europe. Leonhard Ragaz became Brunner1s Pro-
fessor of Systematic Theology at Zurich. •ae was our 
Rauschenbusch - plus Carlyle, and he taught me more than 
all my liberal teachers combined,nl4 thus Brunner still 
lauds him. Brunner furthermore credits him with instilling 
within him the immeasurable worth of personality and com-
munity over against all impersonal systems like Hazism and 
Communism. 
Graduation from Zurich saw him change residence to a 
boy's school in England, where the German speaking Brunner 
taught French to learn English. He is to this day a brilliant 
trilinguist to the extent that be bears a typical English 
accent when he converses in that tongue. This linguistic 
ability enabled him to keep in touch with every important 
theological ~evelopme~t. The outbreak of .iorld War I forced 
him to. leave England and to become a soldier in the Swiss 
army. After the war be held a pastorate in Obstalden for 
some years. Here he discovered two writers who, all in all, 
13. ll21d,., p. 313 
14. Ibid. 
11 
almost had as much influence on him as Karl Barth, namely, 
St. Paul and Boren Kierkegaard. The Danish Socrates, he 
yet declares to be •the greatest Christian thinker of mod-
ern times.•15 
But 1917 and his first •evangelizing together• with 
Karl Barth and Edward Thurenysen produced the most catas-
trophic tU1'n about face. Although then already did he 
have his first argument with the Professor from Bnsle, he 
hastened to pay lasting tribute to him as 1 the renovator 
of_ our theology, 11 and in a review __ he did nQt hesitate to . 
assert Ba~th's Epistle .12.!wl Romans to be a •water-shed 
in rnodern theology• J Heedless to say, these young "crisis 
theologians•1'iiad little difficulty breaking into prominenoe 
when the 11 idea of progress• became a farce and a delusion 
during the First World War. 
The rest of Brunner•s story is contained .in the volumes 
and volumes of his writ\ ngs which can easily fill a shelf 
three feet long. In addition to St. Paul, Ohristian Social-
ism and Kierkegaard, he acknowledges indebtedness to Iren-
aeus and Augustine, Luther and Calvin, and finally to the 
Continental personalists. Kant, Heidegger and Fauerbach 
15. Ibid. Brunner quotes and refers to Kierkegaard n 
infinitum in all his writings, particularly in Revelation 
and Reason. As to the great esteem in which he holds his 
iiiought, ·gt. also the remark: u ••• the very significant ob-
ser vations of Kierkegaard, whioh have never been properly 
valued by anyone .... 11 Emil Brunner, Bexo\atJon~ Beaeon,. 
p. 186, Note: 6. 
16. FQr explanation of 1 orisis theology• £t. infra, p. 32t. 
have influenced him in a negative way, while Overbach and 
Bultmann and Buber directed him along more positive lines. 
We can hardly improve upon Dale Moody, who in hla ex-
cellent article, •An Introduction to Emil Brunner,• dis-
tinguishes three distinct periods in Brunner•s life and 
writings. He characterizes these periods as follows: 
11 (1) the period of criticism in which Brunner searches out 
the weaknesses of modern theology; (a) the period of con-
flict in which he goes beyond Barth and the Oxford Group; 
-and (3) the period of peraonalism in which Brunner comes 
into his own. 1117 
(1) lb.!!. Period,!!!. Orit1c1sm (1914-1928). The first 
notable product of Brunner1s pen, his doctoral dissertation, 
Symbolism J!:!!SlReligious Knowledge (1914), was a firm attack 
on the false intellectualism and scholasticism which, he 
declared, was by no means confined to the Middle Ages but 
had equally wrought havoc in philosophical and theological 
thought.from Kant to Bergson. But w~ must clearly note al-
ready that his solution of the problem is not a disregard 
of all k!lowledge. The solution rather lies in this that he 
who seeks must turn to •a deeper source of knowledge.•18 
His criticism of the many impersonal elements in modern civ-
ilization began in a mild enough fashion taking the form of 
17. Dale Moody, Jm.• .£.U •• p. 314 
18. Barth and Brunner, Natural Theology;, trans. Peter 
raenhal, p. 71, quoted in Abid. 
13 
an address at the Aarauer Studentenkonferenz in 1919. Here 
he m&intatned thnt personality, as understood in the light 
of the Gospel of Ohrtst, has been crushed. 
He continued his campaign for personallem in a book 
called Exnerience, Knowledge and Faith (1921). ·xn this work 
he severely took to task the intellectual schemat!cieta ~ho 
had brought experience and knowledge together apart from 
faith, who on the basts of their philosophy of the identity 
of God with man had so~ght to escape the need of a ttediator. 
His Habilitations Vorlesung on the occasion of his becoming 
nrivatdozent in 19aa at the University of Zurich contained 
another violent criticism of mechanical, still intellectual-
isn1. The name of this work is The Limits ~ Humanity, and 
it is most significant in this resp~ct thet it contains his 
p1•inm.l outline for the relations between ·revelation and 
reason, transcendence and immanence. ~ll,ereas most theolo-
logical thinkers of the optimistic school had bound their 
religious philosonhizing to the immanental alone, Brunner 
now suggested, ~s a result of the collapse of culture and 
civilization in World·War I, that it is really the tr~ns-
cendent sphere which limits humanity. 'l'he Absolute which 
calls a halt to humanity and which is "the crisis of the 
human situation, the ground of faith is God.•19 
In 1924, _a.t the age of thirty-five years, Brunner 
19. Emil Brunner, Die Grenzen der Hwnanita.t, p. 15, 
quoted JJui.., 315. 
14 
became Professor of Systematic a~d Practical T"neolog-f at 
Zurich. This same significant year saw Professor Brunner 
fire the biggest blast thus far in his theological career. 
It was aimed directly ~t Frederick Schleiermaoher and his 
a ttempt to substitute religious experience for revelation. 
Brunner•s criticism declared thu.t Schleiermacher, "The Idol 
of L~bers.lism, 11 with his motto: 11Feeling is all, name and 
sound 1s smoke, 1120 had L1ado religious consciousness and 
specula.tiva rationalism one and tlle same and had entirely 
re1noved the need for the ~'iord of God. The Doctor followed 
up this initial discharge with a barrage of lesser volumes 
like: Philosonhy !:D5! Revelation, Reformation .!!!1i,Romanticism, 
and 1h!, Absoluteness .9,.[ Jesus. 
Because of some friendly crit~cism from Barth's direc-
tion, Brunner now boarded a more constructive train of 
thought, but still could not relinquish altogether hie pen-
c'ha.nt for er 1 tic izing modern theology. Ile hasn't to tllia 
day. HiG next two important volumes, The Philosophy 2'_Rel1-
Jll.2!!.and The Mediator appeared almost at the same time (192?), 
of which the former is prolegomena to the l atter. In the 
former he places greater and more thorough emphasis on the 
relation of revelation to reason, religious experience, his-
tory of religion, and the Bible than ever before. He points 
out the important distinction botffeen philosophy and 
a.o. En1il Brunner, All!. Mystick und das Wort. p .. 5, quoted 
ibid. 
revela tion in the following words: 
To philosophize is to reflect on the mental 
grounds, with the assumption that ultimate 
validity belong to the complex of grounds and 
consequences developed by the na tural reason. 
Christian faith on the other hand involves re-
cognizing that this complex has been broken 
into by revelation. It is on this revelation 
that the affi~fatione of the Christian faith 
are grounded. 
15 
In!. ~ediator takes up the story from here and clari-
fies just what is meant by breaking into this complex of 
grounds of natural reason. It defines also just what is 
meant by revela tion. Here Brunner distingllishes between 
s pecial and general revelation. Special revelation is the 
cllief cluu·a.cteris tic of a.11 popular and social religions. 
Gener al revelation, on the other hand, belongs to the sphere 
of philosophica l religion, which speaks of an "essence of 
r eligion." Concreteness is absolutely essential to special 
revelation, while to general revelation it is purely acoi-
der1tal. Th.to n1eana that the Christian religion is more in-
tirnately conn~cted \'11th popular religions because it is 
very concrete. It is the historical revel ation of Jesus 
Christ. Yet it differs vastly from popular religions also 
because it is characterized by uuniqueneas" (Einmaligkeit). 
Here a.re Brunner• s 01m ,,orda: "The Incarnation of the rlord 
is in its very eosence a. unique event, and this Incarnate 
21. Emil Brunner, ..th!, Philoaopby gt Religion, p. 13. Trana. 
A. J. D. Farrer and B. L. "oolf, German title: Rel1g1onsnb11-
osoph1e evangelischer 'l'heologie. 
16 
,iord can only be one, or it is nothing at all. naa Modern 
theology has obliterated this important distinction between 
general and special revelation, and has nlao forgotten es-
pecially that the Christian revelation comes from beyond 
this mundane creation by a particular, miraculous act of 
revelation. 
(a) The Period ,2'. Conflict (1928-1937). By now Dr. 
Brunner had become a famous theologian, and thus he spent 
the major portion of 1928-29 fulfilling lecture invitations 
e.t tlle Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church at Lan-
caetel', Pennsylvania., and at various universities through-
out Hollra.nd. In his last series of lectures he began to 
accentuate Christian ethics and ~the other tae.k of theology,• 
namely, anthropology. Ke.rl Barth became impe.tient almost 
immediately, and now began that ~truggle which was destined 
to lead to a complete break between the two Swiss dialectical 
t heologians. The conflict began in earnest when the Pro-
fessor of Zurioll in 1929 wrote an ar1;icle entitled, •The 
Other Task of Theology.• He followed the line suggested by 
Pascal and Kierkegaard and ma.de human consciousness the 
point of contact for the Gospel. ihe Uord is never preached 
to a vacum but to a self-conscious hwnan being, anci thus the 
Ohristir1on theologian ZDUl: t come to recognize anthropology as 
a legitin1a.te study, while realizing, of course, tha t the 
aa. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, p . 240. Trans. Olive 
iyon, Germaa title the same. 
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message of the Gospel mu~t al~ays come first. 
A lecture NOn the Orders of God," delivered February 
3, 1939, went still further and boldly grounded Christian 
ethics on the natural orders of Cre&tion. Out of this pre-
liminary lecture grew his monumental tome, lh§. Oomrnandrnent 
.!mi~ Orders _(l932~23 which P~ofeaaor Whilhem Pauck of 
The University of Ohicago hes referred to as the grea test 
theological work published in the last generation. It is 
a brilliant, thought-provoking, w1dely discussed prenente.-
tion of the problem set for ethics on the relation of the 
co1nma11d of God to the natural ordere of society. This is 
Brunner•s reply to the lamentation of the liberals that the 
discussion of ethics has been sorely lac~ing in the Dialec- . 
tical Theology. Dr. Brunner goes to great lengths· in eG-
tablishing Christian ethics on the foundation of the Christ-
ian doctrine of the orders of Creation (Schoepfungsordnungen), 
which he defines accordingly: 
By this we mean those existing facts of human 
corporate life which lie at the root of all his~ 
torical life as an unalterable presupposition, 
which, although their historical forms may vary, 
are unalterable in their foUDdamental structure, 
and, at the same time, relate and unite men to 
one another in a definite way.24 (Emmples 
would be: marriage, the family, labor, the state, 
culture, etc.) 
Brunner•a conclusion is that if God speaks to men through 
33. German title: Das Gebot und die Ordnungen: Entwurf 
einer proteetantisch-tiiiologischen Ethik. trans. Olive ~yon 
under the title: la!! Divine Imnerative. 
24. Emil Brunner, The Divina Imperative, p. 210. 
18 
these natural orders, then the immanence of God in the 
spirit of man and in nature is a problem which Christian 
theology is forced to face. 
Thia volume will play a significant role in the second 
chapter of our discussion, •srunner•a Idea of 'Christian 
philoeppby'1 1 8 because it gives an excellent demonstration 
of the Cllristia.n philosopher 1n action. 
It can be said with few reservations that it was this 
book that made the dialectical, crisis theology famous out-
side of the Continent. Professor J. HcOreary correctly ob-
serves: uxt was in the Brunner of .'nl!!, DivinA Imperative that 
the British and American theologians first began to welcome 
to any appreclable degree the crisis theology that had 
emerged on the Continent in the opposition of Barth to Her-
man."25 But, needless to say, it ,ma anything but welcomed 
by Karl Barth. Because of its very presupposition that 
God does speak through nature, and that man can perceive, 
even though in sin1 the revelation of God in the natural 
orders, the Professor of Basle considered it worthless, 
yea, worse than worthless. Yet Barth managed to contain 
his impatient silence until Emil Brunner issued lY, lju.eation 
.2!..th§. Point ,2f Contact in Theology. in which he definitely 
relates discontinuity to continuity and states that man's 
formal (in opposition to his material) personality still 
35. John mcCreary, JE.• cit., p. 210. 
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retains the Imago R!1, has the capacity for perception and 
is the point of contact for the Gospel. 
In seething vexation Barth could contain himself no long-
er and let fly with both barrels J Three articles burst 
.forth almost simultaneously: •rate and Idea in Theology,• 
"Theology and Present Day Jlan, • and "Theology and Modern 
Missions.• In the first he stoutly rejected any polarity 
between philosophy and theology. In the second and third 
he loudly decried any attempt of the modern missionary to 
f i nd a •point of contact• for the preaching of the Gospel. 
A suboequent article of equally violent nature even accused 
Brunner of lapsing into a Thomistic natural theology. Brun-
ner could not let his pen lie idle either in the face of 
such invective. He poured forth articles defending his 
ffnatural theology," and in the last of these he demanded 
that present day theology find its way back to a more sound 
natural theology. Such an order Barth could only interpret 
as adding grievous insult to severe injury, and so be shouted 
in angTy :cetaliation with the curt and caustic .!!.!ll!!I He ex-
plosively declared that to grant man any "susceptibility to 
the ~ord of r-oa,• and •addressability,• and •verbicompetence• 
is to deny explicitly the Reformation doctrine of .!.2J4S!1-
,a. Again and again he emphatically declaimed that the sub-
jective point cf contact (Anknuepfungspunkt) is created 
anew by grace. To say anything lees than that, as Brunner 
was doirig, was to render worthless the doctrine of total 
20 
deprav1 ty. The cleavage between the t~,o Sw1.ss theologians 
was complete and so the battle still goes on toda.y~ 
Emil Brunne~•s second period of conflict concerned it-
self with Frank Buchman and the Oxford Group, but the out-
come of thi~ conflict when compared to that with B~rth is 
as different as night and day because the attack on the Ox-
ford Group resolved itself into a joyous reconciliation 
with Brunner•s becomtng the theologian of the group. Let 
t _hat not minimize the seriousness or the severity \'11th 
which Brunner precipitated the initial attack. f hen he 
went to lecture at Princeton and there found faculty and 
. 
students deeply engrossed in all sorts of Oxfordian spirit-
ual awakenings and experiences, he denounced this "error of 
Methodism" ,vith the greatest vehemence. He outright.ly con-
demned it ae a "vitiating influence upon orthodox thin~-
ing" that could only result from a •deplorable misunder-
sta.nding0 of Romans VII and VIII .• as The O:xf ordian awaken-
ings, in a. most disasterous fa.sh-ion, turned the individual 
from the 'lord of God to religious experience. And at that 
time Professor Brunner had little room for religious ex-
perience: 
Therefore faith must cling solely to the Word, 
but not to experience. Experience comes from faith, 
but faith never comes from experience. The prin-
ciple of Christian life is not experience but the 
as. Emil Brunner, l'l!!, Theology 9!, Crisis, p. 21, quoted 
by Dale Moody, .sm,. cit., p. 323. 
~ord of God, which can only be believed "9 gap-
not be experienced. (Underlining my own. ? 
A second contact with this revivalistic group came 
a1 
when he lectured at King's College at the University of 
London in 1931, but it only increased the fervor of his~ 
tipatlly. Yet a. third contact was forced upon him ithen the 
movement began to stir the very foundations of Zurich, and 
directed him finally to attend a hcuse party in Ermatinger. 
Then a.11d there, almost with the suddenness a.nd forcefulness 
of an Old Testament vision, it came upon him that this vig-
or.ous movement had definite possibilities for resuscitating 
the :11oribund Church about him. True enough, there was much 
or nonsense and superficiality in it that did not escape his 
oritioal eye, but where else had there appeared sucll a hope-
ful si~11 for the revival of the Church which was f a iling 
abominably to satisfy the masses• pangs of hunger for the 
eternal bread of life? This is abundantly certain the.t af-
ter his espousal of the Ox.ford Group, Brunner made & sharp 
about face from his earlier assertions that had made revela-
tion and religious experience mutually exclusive. This is 
quite evident in his subsequent production entitled, l'.11!. 
Church and the Oxford Group, \Vhich is his word of congratu-
lation to the group and commendation to the world for the 
great role the Group had played in the revival of the Church. 
37. Ibid., p. 64, quoted ..121!1• 
aa 
Therein he states quite revealingly: 
According to the lew Testament teaching, faith 
creates experience and not the contrary. But f a itll 
s!Qll create this experience, this new thing which is 
to be perceived in experience. -He who tes chea 
otherwise does-
3
not remain in the tradition of the 
New Testament. S 
A vast difference is already discernible here bet~een Mfaith 
~ create this experience, this new thing which is :per-
ceived in experience,M and his earli~r statement before tbe 
American students at Lancaster: -•The principle of tbe Christ-
i an life le not experience but the nord of Cod, which can 
onlx be. believed mid oannot be exner\enced.• (Underlining 
my own.)29 
This chasm between hia· earlier and l a ter beliefs gre~ 
even more pronounced ~hen Professor Brunner1s fourth large 
volume appeared, his monumentel J:!!n.!!!.Revolt. 30 In chief-
ly attending to the possibilitien of setting forth a Christ-
ian antlmopology, the author also stresses the relation or 
revelation to human experience. Indeed, here f a ith and ex-
perience become so intimate that Brunner declares the Bible 
procla ims no other faith than that -:1hich is exoerience, 1. e. 
11 a real meeting with the real God. 1131 The ~iord of God nev-
er la.ya claim on man ape.rt froin hie experience. It is only 
38. Emil Brunner, The Church ,m the Oxford Oroun, p. 55, 
quoted ibid., p. 324. · 
29. _2!. footnote no. 27. 
30. Trans. Olive Wyon. German title: ~ l.lensch !!l , 1der-
sprugh. 
31. Emil Brunner, K!:!!. .!!!. Revolt, p. 205. 
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in this way thAt man recognizes h1s 11actual state, as he 
really is, 1133 hie contradiction before God. Karl Barth 
was only one among 1nany who well suspictoned that with such 
sta tements Brunner es ma.king some r ~ther elaborate amen.de 
for his severe criticism of ex.perience in earlinr writings.• 
These suspicions ~ere soon confirmed by Brunner•s own con-
fession: 
For the grave injustie:;~hich undoubtedly has 
been done P1etism during the past twenty years, 
I !ael it a duty, ac one of those more or less 
responsible, to make some amends. It is pre-
cisely v1e - the group of 1dialectic' theologians 
who several years back still enjoyed some unity 
in being fellow combatants - who have every 
reason to remember Pietism with the highest gra-
t i tud.e.33 · 
hen ~ve compare this prese!nt embracing attitude toward 
e:tperience ,., 1th the antagonisrn aroused by bis firs t intro-
duction to the Oxford Group, ·,-:e may r.:ell sllout: quantum 
nautatus !2, illo J and quietly add that loVP. a t £1.:rs t sight 
may not be the strongest love after all. Incidentally, this 
newly found love of Brunner•s only accentuates Barth's an-
tipathy for his theological opponent. 
(3) la!. Period m: Pers·onaliem (1938 ---). While the 
two 11B1 s 11 were taking in hand the reins of Reformed theolo-
gy in Switzerland and directing it along renewed paths, also in 
Sweden theology was undergoing a critical etate of agitation 
32. l!l!,g,., p. 306 
33. Emil Brunnsr, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 39, 
trans. A. ~- Loos. German title: Wahrheit !:!!. Begegnung. 
24 
and transition. Because Brunner had demonstrated himself 
as being a competent, authoritative and popular guide 
. through the ~shed out beds of the very fluid modern the-
ology, he was invited to deliver the famous Claus Petri 
lectures at the University of Upsala in the Fall of 1937. 
The President of the Foundation at that time, Professor A. 
Runestam, suggested .that Athe relation between the objec~ 
tive and the s~bjective in the Christian faithA34 be ma4-
the theme of the lectures. This suggestion struck a B1DP 
pathetic chord in Dr. Brunner•s soul the like of which was 
rarely struck before! 
For years Brunner had been fighting an intense battle 
on t wo fronts, one against the false subjectivism of mod-
ernism, and the other against the false objectivism of 
. 
orthodoxy. Both ru~noualy perverted the true conception 
of the Biblical tradition in their over-emphasis of their 
respective extreme. But now he could, with this volume, 
make a permanent "break-through• into the realm of the per-
sonal. But let Brunner speak for himself: 
This theme has proven to be an extremely val-
uable starting point for reflection abo~t the 
Biblical concept of truth - reflection which led 
to the insight, important -alike for theology and 
for the practical work of the Church, that our · 
understanding of the mes sage of salvation and 
also of the Church's task is still burdened with 
the Subject-Object antithesis which originated 
in Gr$ek philosophy. i'h~ Biblical conception 
34. Ibid., p. 7. (foreword) 
of truth is, truth as encounter.35 (Thus the 
German title of his book m i'lahrheit ala Be-
gegrmng.) 
Astonishing results were achieved when Brunner applied 
this conception of Biblical truth to different phases of 
life and practice, as he himself asserts by declaring that 
if his thesis be correct, •then indeed muah of our thinking 
and action in the Church must be different from what we 
have been accustomed to for oanturiee.•36 That his new 
proposition for truth has made quite an impression already 
is attested to by Dale Moody of Southern Baptist Theologi-
cal Semina-ry who announces: •Thia slender volume, read 
by the undiscerning as just another book, is likely to 
become a turning point in the interpretation of truth.•37 
Much more will be said about this significant writing 
in Chapter III of this discussion, for exactly the intri-
guing usubject-Object antithesis0 and his •divine-human 
encounter• principle will be the topic of that section. 
A year later saw the famous Swiss again sail for 
America, escaping from the plaguing Barthian controversies, 
and bearing an invitation to lecture at Princeton Seminary. 
But there a controversy broke out in the Presbyterian 
Church engaged in chiefly by the fundamentalist Dr. Barn-
house and the more liberal President Mackay of Princeton. 
35. Jlwi. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Dale Moody, .211• £l1., p. 326 
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Thia controversy proved to be more violent and intolerable 
than the seething theological cauldron from which Brunner 
had fled. 38 So, the very next yea.r he returned to his 
beloved Zurich just as World War II exploded ln Europe. The 
trying war years saw him busier than ever with preaching 
and with reconcerted efforts to apply the Christian faith 
to the eoct al order, especially in the light of the pecul-
iar problems presented by the war. Yet he took time to 
follow through on bis Upsala lectm:-es. Hineteen hundred 
forty-one saw another tremendous volume of thought and pene-
tration go to the press, hta scholarly Revelation and B!!!,-
son.39 The first part of this book is a reiteration of 
much of the thesis presented rud1metarily in lAI., Mediator, 
1. e. a thorough discussion of natural theology, revelation 
in the Creation and historical revelation. Natural theol-
ogy is the Catholic doctrine that man in his sin ~nd. with-
out direct Biblical revelation can come to a valid knowledge 
of God. This sort of theology the Professor of Zurich com-
pletely disavows, and Barth praises him for it. But they 
come to blows again when Dr. Brunner begins discussing man 
as a •theonomoua0 being, a being related to God who is God's 
human partner in the process of revelation. Of course, man 
38. For a detailed presentation, .sz.t. D. G. Barnhouse, 
•some "1Uestions for Professor Brunner n and J. A. Mackay, 
•some Answer.a for Dr. Barnhouse,• in +he Presbyterian, Vol. 
CVIII, No. 181 (~ay, 1938), pp. 8ff. 
39. Tr.ans. Olive Viy.on. .German title: Offenbarung l!!!l, I!.£ 
nunft. 
a, 
cannot even attain the truth of the revelation of Crea-
tion, which includes sin, by himself. Only in the "unique• 
bre~king through of the Word made flesh into the realm 
of the earthly, which is the historical revelation, can 
he come to comprehend the revelation in Creation and hia 
sin. Thie makes possible the free man, the man ruled 
only by agape. the J!i!!!. whose reason !!. completely w. l!:n· 
Whereas in the poaitivistio, rationalistic metaphyaicist 
"reason arrogates to itself the right to define the whole 
range of truth from the standpoint of ma.n,• now reason op-
erates from the legitimate standpoint of God, and "within 
the truth of revelation all that reason knows and recog-
nizes falls into place.•40 The proper placement of the 
Christian's reason makes Christian philosophy not only po11-
sible but essential and. unavo1d.&ble. 
The reader has correctly surmized already that it is 
this work of Brunner 1s which will play the most important 
role as this dissertation .advances, particularly in the 
nexv chapter whtch will concern itself solely with Dr. 
Brur1ner•s idea of •Christian philosophy.• In this book 
he for the first time clearly sets forth in some detail 
his Christian philosophy devoting an entire chapter to this 
theme alone, though the theme has bobbed to the fore many 
times in nearly every one of his previous works. 
40. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 213. 
as 
Two years later, 1943, Brunner ~ut to practical test 
his theeie presented in Revelation .!DSl, Reason in another 
highly significant volume which he simply called Juetica.41 
Deploring the fact t:tiat •the Protestant O.hurch is ao un-
sure of itself in questions of the social order, economics, 
law, politics and international law anc1 ••• (that) its 
statemento on these subjects are so haphazard and impro-
vised that they fail to carry convict!on,•42 Dr. Brunner 
strives to restore some sense to all the chaos by defining 
and applying justice. Here we definitely see the Christ-
ian philosopher in action as he seeks to discover the why, 
wherefore and whereunto of law, politics, economics, fam-
ily and society. 
Emil Brunner•s last great contribution to the world 
of theological literature thus far, and perhaps the begin-
ning of his finest, appeared in 1946. It was the first 
volume of his proposed four vo·lwne systematic theology 
bearing the title, .lw!, Christian Doctrine~ God.43 After 
years of impatient delay, the Swiss theologian bad finally 
found time to follow up•bis principle which had blazed 
a trail for the complete rethinking of the Christian faith, 
"truth as encounter,u set forth first in The Divine-Buman 
Encounter. The task of theology la also given particular 
41. Trane. llary Hottinger. German title: Gerechtikeit. The 
English edition bears the title: Justice Ys! the Social Order. 
42. Ibid •• p. 1. (Foreword) , 
43. German title: Die Ohristliche Lehre !:2!l Gott, Zurich, 
Zwingli-Verlag, 1946. 
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emphasis in this production. In a few words• that task is 
to see to it that Christian revelation keeps abreast of the 
times. To achieve that end there can be no final, absolute, 
once-for-all system of Christian doctrine. Dogmatics must 
remain entirely flexible so that it can perform the task of 
"a mediator in between worldly science and a supra-worldly 
testimony of faith.•44 By this method Christian revelation 
can maintain its station unblushingly and remain vital and 
valid for any scientific world view that future generations 
may evolve. Thus today, Emil Brunner - prolific writer, 
brilliant lecturer. stirring preacher - has taken bis etand 
and is zealously striving to reinterpret, theologically and 
philosophically what he thinks Christianity must be ma.de to 
mean for his community and for the whole world at large if 
the Church would endure. 
It may be woll to discuss two terms ~hich a.re insepar-
ably united with the names of Barth and Brunner, which do 
not, however, make a direct debut in this dissertation, 
namely, "dialectical theology" and its inunediate descendant, 
•crisis theology.• All other terms necessitating elucidation 
will be defined as they are introduced into the discussion. 
The dictionary does not assist us a great deal in de-
fining "dialectic," but we know that the word is derived 
44. !l!!sl·, p. 77, quoted in Dale ~oody, .sm, • .£11., p. 338. 
from the combination of two Greek words:/>,-.· and J:,,,~. 
These t wo words mean •to speak between. ~ Dialectics is 
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just that, a skillful method of •speaking between. 0 Two 
affirmations are made, the one. ia contradictory to the 
other, and yet they do not cancel each other out because one 
oan always •speak between• them or withhold speaking at all. 
Neither of two paradoxical statements can be accepted to the 
entire exclusion of the other because there is never such 
a remaining statement that contains only a •no.• Every oon-
tradiotory statement, except such naive oontradiotions as: 
"this paper is white• and •this paper is black, 11 embodies 
the possibility of a •yea• at the same time. Barth puts 
it most intelligibly of all when he says: "There is never so 
decisive a yes that it does not harbor the possibility of 
a no. There is never so decisive a no that it is not li-
able to turn into a yes. 1145 An exarnple pure and simple 
are the two seemingly appositional statements: •ur. Xis 
a bad man,• and •ur. Xis a good man." Yet everyone well 
realizes that neither .in the first case is Mr. X always 
bad, nor that in the second case is he always_ good. So 
when all is said and done, we conclude that Mr.Xis both 
bad and good. Thus a dialectical situation is one about 
which we must say yes and no at the same time in order to 
45. Karl Barth, Das Wort Gottes Jm!lJUA Theologie, p. 75, 
quoted in Theodore Engelder, MThe Principles and Teachings of 
the Dialectical Theology,• in Concordia Theological Konthlv. 
Vol. VII, No. 4, (April, 1936), p. 249. 
rightly understand and explain it.46 Brunner tells ua 
how and why this principle must be introduced into the 
theological field: 
I have often been asked what the 'Dialectical 
Theology' is really driving at. The question can 
be easily answered. It is seeking to declare 
the i4iord of the Bible to the world. • • • Wha,t the 
1ord of God does is to expose the contradiction 
of human existence, thus in grace to cover it • 
••• It is only by means of the contradiction be-
tween two ideas - God and man, grace and respon-
sibility, holiness and love - that we can appre-
hend ~he contradictory truth that the eternal God 
enters time, or that sinful man is declared just. 
Dialectical theology is the mode of thinking which 
defends this paradoxical character, belonging to 
faith-knowledge, from the non-paradoxical specu-
lation4of reason, and vindicates it age.inst the 
other. 7 
This principle of the dialectic is derived plainly 
,1,]4 Kierkegaard. He introduced the practice of frankly 
failing to complete the third aide of the Hegelian tri-
angle. Against this same optimistic, triwnphant and ration-
alistic attainment of synthesis, both Barth and Brunner, in 
forming their theological systems, find it wiser, more real-
istic and only truthful to the Biblical and Reformation tra-
dition to be content with an open, unresolved balance of 
apparent truth against apparent truth. 
The dialectic is their very raison d'etre, for through 
it the individual Ohriatian must remain alive, responsible 
46. Paul L. Lehmann, "The Direction of Theology Today,• 
in Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. III, lo. 1, (Nov-
ember, 1947), p. 8. 
47. Emil Brunner, ll!!. i7ord !U!!! ~ World, pp. Sf, quoted 
JJwl. ' p. 8. . 
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and a man of personal decision in any crisis &1tuat1on 
that 1night a.nd will arise in life and practice. To Kierk-
egaard the Ohurcb of Denmark wae the institution par ex-
cellance into which tho Christian might flee for refuge, 
and there do collectively what he would not ·dare to under-
take as a responsible individua.l. Saye Professor Kwin of 
Asl>ury Seminary concerning Kierkegaard: 11 'l'he primary re-
1 lgious problem appeared to him to be that of iaolat\ng 
the individual and conf~onting him with himself as person-
ally culpable, and with the 'Absolute Paradox' of the en-
try of eternity into time in the Incarnation.n48 In other 
words, the worst thing that the Church can do is to resolve 
all the pa.rad.oxes, answer a;l.l the questions in legalistic 
dogma, take everything in hand as an organiz&tion so that 
~r. Ohristian becomes complacent, self-satisfied, with not 
a care in the world. Mr: Christian must be made to face 
his crisis, primarily that crisis which arises when God 
meets him and he meets God, but also the many smaller cri-
ses that are bound to •ppear in Christian living. 
11 'l'he word crisis, 0 according t ·o Brunner, "has two mean-
ings: first, it signifies the climax of an illness; second, 
it denotes the turning point in the. progress of an enter-
prise or movement. 0 49 'l'he heavy mark of accentuation falls 
48. Harold B. Kuhn, 11The Problem of Human Self-tranacen-
dancc in the Dialectical Theology,~ in The Harvard Theologi-
cal Review, Vol. XL, Ho. 1, (January, 1947), p. 8. 
49. l!:mil Brunner, Theology .2f Orisia, p. 1, quoted in 
Paul L. Lehmann, Jm.• .sz.!1., p. 6. 
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upon the •turning point,• the lesser on the •climax.• 
Brunner states that the course of events in any individ-
ual life or in a cultural epoch are continually moving 
toward one climax after ·another. In the crucial moment 
the person confronted must face the climax and make the 
radi~al turn about face required in his life if his life 
or culture about him is to have any meaning. The respona-
.!l!ll person makes the decision and moves forward. Con-
cludes Brunner: 0 What it all means then is that our atti-
tude to the demand for faith is not a matter of reason, 
whether positive or negative, but of personal decision. 
The value of critical reflection lies in the fact that it 
necessitates personal decision.• (Underlining lllJ' own.)50 
The general purpose of the remainder of the paper and 
the particular purpose of Chapter II will be to investigate 
Brunneris idea of •ohristian philosophy• in theory and in 
practice. Following out his doc~rine of man's reason we 
shall see why Christian philosophy is not only possible but 
absolutely inescapable since the C~i~tian must live in the 
State and play a role in culture, science and educ~tion. Be 
cannot avoid doing so. Part of Brunner1s thesis is due 
great commendation and pr~ise, while other aspects of it 
are by no means invulnerable to adverse criticism. 
50. Emil Brunner, The Philoaonby of Religion, p. 188. 
The third and final ohapter will conaern itself with 
our principal exception to Dr. Brunner•s thesis. This 
principal criticism is directed against the result that 
theologian-philosopher Brunner obtained when he bepn to 
investigate the age old problem, •what is truth?", that 1••· 
in particular, Christian truth. His conolusion is that 
there can be no real Christian truth except where the Phil-
onic Subjective-Objective antithesis is cast out ent.irely 
and the •Biblical• •divine-human encounter• principle is 
employed. ~e maintain that in projecting this •truth as 
encounter• principle as a Biblical one, Brunner is over-
steppi~ his bounds~ introducing reason into revelat1on 
and thus violating one of his own basic laws. 
Of course, this attempt is little more than an intro-
duction to an immense mind which has produced some classic 
tomes exhibiting keen thought, deep penetration aDd schol-
arly research in a host of subjects. Bot only has Brunner 
achieved great respect from the alert theologian, but he 
is also well recognized by various authorities not of the-
ological bent. As John McCreary points out: •Br~er has 
found sympathizers among those who have difficulty in accept-
ing his •transcendentalism' - who, working in the fields of 
social psychology, ethics, and soc!~l philosophy, realize. 
nevertheless the numbing effec-t of a mer·e description of 
'•hat is done in various oultur·es •.•51 For the student 
51. John McCreary, .sm,. 9.U.. , p. 330. 
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who would like to probe deeper into Brunner•a thought 
there are such interesting and profitable subjects as: 
the Word, faith, revelation, natural theology, Imago Dei, 
mysticism, anthropology_. ethics, the State, marriage, the 
family, justice, economics and Christian psychology and 
sociology. On all of these Brunner has much of great 
value to say. 
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II. Brunner•s Idea of Christian Philosophy 
•Christian philosophy ia a faot , •1 With this rather 
bold assertion Emil Brunner opens Chapter as of Revelation 
.!DSi Reason, entitled: •The Problem and Idea of Christian 
Philosophy.• It is a fact for two reasons: first, be-
cause a great number of philosophical concepts which a 
philosopher e~ploys today in his thinking and speculation 
have been created by Christian philosophers. One simply 
cannot think of the history of philosophy in the 11est, 
of thinkers like Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz, with-
out being aware of the tremendous role th~t faith played in 
the formulations of their systems. Secondly, because no 
honest Christian theologian, no matter how hostile he might 
be to philosophy, can operate without philosophical con-
cepts that have been coined for him by the secular meta-
physicians. Therefore, •the synthesis of philosophy and 
Christianity, in some way or other, is a fact that cannot 
be undone; it is part of our desti:ny.•3 
The Christian philosophy becomes more evident and more 
necessary when the theologian is forcefully reminded that 
the Bible does not furnish all the answers, in spite of the 
fact that Barth tries to maintain that it does. 8 The Gospel: 
1. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 374. 
a.~-, p. 375. 
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be ea.ye, "as tha mass&!}e ot Jesus Ch1"1st, reveals to the 
1 culturecl1 man 01" uoCiu.an tb.e poesib111ty 11 t he necess.1.ty11 the 
me..in 1nr- 11 t he run~e, and the snlution nf the ta3k of culture. n3 
In atern oppos1tlon to th1R Burt'11an view that Christian rov-
els tion '1us t h e r 11•st, last and '>nly cord even in matters of 
secula1• knr)l'!lGdf.8 and 1n the ordering of the r r,1•ld. ( the St6.te 
t oo) 11 Brunnor cteclares: 
can anyona sart ously maint:ail'I that all questions 
i n mathematics, physic~s, biolor-;1' 1 ond 1:ist1"011omy o.re 
1 answarad 1n the Word of God•, Does anyone seri1>usl7 
content th.at in the future, instoacl of turnin::~ to 
h.'uclld fol" geometry, to Galileo f or physics, to 'Ly-
ell f'or r,eology, we n1ust tu.rn instead I for every-
t h ing, to t ho Holy scriptures! 
'l'lw na1 vete of cuch a v1<¾W is excelled onl~f by its sheer 
imposs 1b111ty bee use ~ee&Use r ntlonal activity is alreudy 
presup osed in the -ramm tical unders tQnd1n r of' tha Bible. 
Her e already t here mu"t be lo@ical th1nk1nn and tra ining 
1n the use of ideas. Hence this exclusive, o.rb1trary em-
ph~sis ~n tho Bible us the source of everythin3 does not 
solve but only confuses the problem set up _by Cqristian 
philosonh.y. To toss the v1hole problem out of the tsindow 
1s no s olution. Barely hns one done thet '\':hon lle stumbles 
a ns.inst the hurd t1•utb oc;a:.1n: "Reason is reu.son; t he1•e is 
onl y one reason • • • • J\11 ,;;ho wish to th1.nk 1:.t all must 
think according to tho 1•ules of this, onB ret!son, \·;h1cb is 
exactly the soma for e ll; if'·a mo.n does not think in this 
3. Karl Barth, Evangelium ~ B1ldunp,, P• 10, quoted 1n 
1b1d. 1 p. 377. 
--:(. ~•• P• 378. 
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way, he. is not I thinking' at all; he is •merely indulging iil 
fantasy. 115 
•Reason• as employed by Brunner in his writings needs 
elucidation. Nowhere does he clearly. define -in so many 
words just what he means by reason, but through a typolo-
gical analysis we can perceive that he uses it in three gen-
eral sensea. 6 He uses, it first in the sense of man's gen-
eral capacity for thought, for speech and for communication. 
It i~ identified also au the humanum, or the natural endow-
n1ent of intelligence that God bestowed upon ma.n at the time 
of his Creation. The human being can never loose this es-
sential oharacteristio which is a refiect1on of the divine 
image in him, for to do that would be to cease to be a hu-
man creature. Even the Fall did not eradicate this primary 
feature. •The imago, in the first sense of the word (formal 
sense as distinguished from material), cannot be lost, for 
it distinguishes man as man, in his nature; it is true of 
it, manet .!!!1!, peccato adhuc.•7 This first interpretation 
of man's reason is vastly important because it is this pri-
mal reason that makes man responsible and gives God a 
"point of contact" in man. 8 Uan1 s reason therefore is al-
so the cause of his eternal unrest •••• It ls precisely 
the activity of the reason whioh is the unmistakable sign 
5. Ibid., p. 375. 
6. Outlined by D. D. Williams in •Brunner and Barth on 
Philosophy,• in l2!!!, Journal At Religion, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 
(October, 1947), p. 243. 
7. Emil Brunner, ml• .s;,U., p. 69. 
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that man comes from God.•8 The human creature differs 
from the other creations of God as rooks, trees and animals 
precisely because he has this •point of oontaot.• He could 
not enter the community of believers without it. Ao Brunner 
expresses it: 
One does not have to have a great mind to be a 
person who truly believes and loves; but if one 
has no mind - as an idiot - one cannot even be-
lieve. The presupposition for the understanding 
of the Word of God is understanding in general, 
the understanding of words, in the general, pure-
ly human sense. What that poor creature which, 
in the extreme case, so far as we know, has not 
a spark of intelligence means in the Family of 
God, we do not know; we only know that in this 
life it cannot become a believe9, because it cannot understand human speech. 
In Brunner•s second use of reason, the classification 
has broadened out to include all the activities and prin-
ciples of •reasoning" as they are demonstrated in logic, 
science, ethics and metaphysics. All these practical appli-
cations of reason grow directly out of man's humanum. Un-
der this second grade of reason Brunner would also rate our 
God-given common sense • . As before cited in the case of those 
"radical fideists 11 who would make the Bible the source of 
everything sacred and secular, this second use of reason is 
as inescapable as the first. \ihat intelligent Ohristian man 
doesn't think according to logical rules, use his common 
sense, acce·pt the established finding of science, attempt 
to apply bis Christian learning and experience to practical 
a. D.1d. • .a. p. ss. 
9. EiiU .arunner, At!!! in Revolt, p. 341. 
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problems of moral living, and ask the proverb1al question, 
•what is truthn? The Ohr1atian theologian mUAt and does al-
ways employ this second use of reason. •Even in a definite-
ly Christian theolog1cal anthropology there can never be any 
question of depreciating the reason, of hostility to reason, 
or of setting up a plea for irrationalism. If Ne must choose 
between two evils, then w1thout stopp1ng to reflect for a 
moment we shall choose to be rat1onalists rather than 1rra-
tionalists.•10 When the theologian in all honesty and humil-
ity employs his reason here, he is not distracting from or 
violating his faith, for, "It is not reason as such which 
is in opposition to faith, but only the self-sufficient rea-
son •••• There is war between faith and rationalism, but 
there is no war between faith and reason •••• ■11 
But since already here in his natural thinking about 
ethics, ontology and the meaning of life, the human person 
1s coming to grips w1th questions and decisions of absolute 
truth and value he is approaching Brunner•s th1rd UBJ of 
reason. It involves the natural man's attempt to arrive at 
absolute truth about existence and about God apart from the 
transcendent knowledge of revelation. This is philosophy 
in Brunner•s usual sense of the term, and is, of course, 
strictly verboten. Philosophy - Theism, Naturalism, Panthe-
ism and :t4aterial1sm - sets up its own system in the place of 
10. lJllJ!. , p. 343. 
11 • .l,ej4. 
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God's, makes human reason supreme, and consequently worships 
an idol of its own fashioning. The majority of Brunner•s 
work and writing takes the form of a scathing polemic against 
this third type - this impersonal, abstract reason. 1 The 
abstract reason,• he declares, 1 is that which is already 
severed from God, the falsely autonomous, falsely independ-
ent reas,)n, the reason of the man whose whole self has been 
isolated.•12 And though Mthe human mind may find elevation 
and satisfaction in this rational theology; it will not find 
in it the •truth which niakes us free•. 013 The entirety of 
his constant battle against philosophy can be sum,ried up in 
Augustine's classic words, "Si comprehendis, non ,ill~.• 
Just as one arrives at no solution to the problem of 
Christian philosophy by rejecting it altogether and acknow-
ledging no validity of truth outside Scripture, neither does 
one find any solution by denying the validity of all truth 
inside Scripture. W~ile we all (nearly all) agree that the 
multiplication tables and the laws of logical thought a.re 
the same for all men, Christians and pagans alike, we do not 
agree that all bold the same doctrine of ;nan and bis respon-
sibil.ity. There is definitely a singula.r Christian doctrine 
of freedom and responsibility, of existence, of 1narriage, 
and of the calling. Therefore even the rationalist has to 
admit that he comes into decided conflict with a host of 
1a. ~-, p. 430 
13. Emil Brunner, Revelationmd Reason, p. 363. 
other thinking human beings when be flatly discredits all 
revelation and strives to solve the above problems by ra-
tionalistic methods alone. At the same time, "Even the most 
doughty champion of the Biblical truth of revelation a.s the 
sole solution of these 'ultimate• questionsnl4 must confess 
that there are areas· .of secular and formal kno~1ledge s.nd 
activity, as logic and m·~tllematics, where reason alone 1s 
competent. '!'he Bible simply does not furnish information 
in these areas. In other words, there is a distinct dual-
ism present here, the extre1ne roles being played by the 
"fideist11 on the one hand and the rationalist on the other. 
It is plainly not satisfactory to try to solve the problem 
by forming a false monistic syn_thesia between reason and 
revelation, philooophy and theology. 
The question that confronts Ohristian theology then is 
not whether reason has any rights or whether reason has any 
authority to judge the false and the true, for it certainly 
does. God has created a world. In this world there are im-
personal, objective truths like the truths of mathematics 
and science which are by no means eliminated by the revela-
tion of Jesus Christ. Besides these there are the impersonal 
truths which are not concerned with "things. 11 All these lat-
ter impersonal truths constitute tbe ,1orld of ideas, the in-
tellectual world. 8 These are not merely aids to our thinking, 
14 • .ll?J&., p. 379. 
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but principles which hav.e their basis in th~ thoughts of 
God. ~e are meant to use them also, and they are not above 
us, but under ·us. n15 Of all the creatures known to us God · 
gave to man a.lone the oapa.oity to know this ·uorld as He es-
tablished it in His Creation. "This capacity we call 'the 
povrer of rational perception'. 1116 God has revealed Himself 
not only through the Word but also in the Creation. On the 
basis of this primary revelation in the Creation and pass-
ages like, "The earth has He given to. the children of men,•17 
man bas be~n given the power to know and dominate the Orea-
t ion by means of his reason. When Adara and Eve were in the. 
Garden and ate Qnly of' the fruit of the allowed trees there 
was no problem because there was no discrepancy between their 
reason and God's revelation. The problem was first intro-
duced by the Fall and sin. Sin threw everything out of per-
spective. Sin set up a •peculiar, irrational barrier" to 
God's original revelation. Reason, transgressed its bounds 
and ate of the ·forbidden fruit. It retu.aed to respect the 
holy -center :and attempted to partake of God's divine mystery 
thus exalting itself beyond measure. ·Sin created the ter-
rific problem between reason and revelation with which every 
Christian and particularly every theologian must now wrestle. 
15. Ibid., p. 379. 
16. Ibid., p. 381. 
17. Psalm 115:16. 
Because reason is not evil mll:Jl!!., but only in so far 
as it is affected by sin and thus is conat~ntly in danger 
of overstepping its boundaries, 'the problem of reason versus 
revelation is mainly one of delimiting the autonomous reason. 
It is against the reason that v1ould make absolute and ulti-
mate claims that the Christian must constantly fight. Con-
sequently, the problem finally resolves itself into •one Qf 
defining the sphere of reference.•18 Or it might also be 
called the proble1n of the II specialist. 11 I~o Christian how-
ever deeply his faith is grounded in revealed Scripture will 
seriously maintain that the Bible supplies all or even ade-
qu&te information in the fields of special or expert know-
ledge. 'l'he Word of God cannot be a substit~te for what the 
specialist 11 knows of himself" about the making of machinery, 
about counterpoint, about the 1ntric~ies of semantics, or 
about balancing the powers of the State. •In all these ques-
tions. reason is suprerue, and reason alone. 1119 
However, it is impossible to sever even this expert 
knowledge from the whole context. Here the problec arises 
again. All these specialists callings a man 14ust carry on 
as a man, and hence they cannot be isolated COinpletely from 
the context of his entire life. Where his entire life is 
viewed there theology or faith must also be viewed •. The 
problem does not arise from the specialist knowledge as 
18. Emil Brunner, Revelation .!mi Reason, p. 380. 
19. ll!W,. 
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such, but from its integration into the whole. Here he 
must listen to the voice offaith, the Word or revelation 
given to faith. The nub of the matter is ultimately this: 
"'l'he prol>lem of Ohrsitian philosophy io the problem of the 
interpenetration of the two Dpheree, of the secular and 
knowable, and. the supernatura1 and revealed. It is the ques-
tion of the limitations of the specialist.•20 As already 
stated, it is because of sin only that the question ·arises 
at all, that the specialist must be limited. 
How does Dr. Brunner propose to lirai t tlle specialist 
affected by ein and thus solve the problem of the inter-
penetration or the t i,o spheres? He does that by the for-
mation of a clever proportion&l thesis called the w1aw of 
the closeness of relation. 1121 He leads up to the forma-
tion of this thesis by declaring again that no theologian 
thus far known to him h&.s held that our mathernatical know-
led8e or our formal logic ie affected by sin. However, on 
the other side of the fence, all are a.greed that our know-
ledge of God - as regarding our personal relation witll Him -
is most deeply affected by sin. Indeed, ·that broken relation 
is the nature of sin itself. But even stn· and faith, the 
\'lrong and right relation with Goci, presuppose the e111ployment 
of formnl reason. Now thio state of affairs cannot be in-
dicated by drawing any absolute: line ot dema.rco.tion, but 
20. Ibid., p. 381. 
21. Ibid., p. 383. 
only by the proportional statement: 
The nearer anything lies to the center of ex-
istence where we a.re concerned with the whole, 
that is, with man's relation to -Cod and the being 
of the person, the greater is the disturbance of 
rati~nal knor.ledge by sin; the farther anything 
lies from this center, the less ls the disturbance 
felt, and the lees difference is there betwe~n 
knowing as a believer and aa an unbellever!aa 
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In theology this disturbance reac~as its maximum extension, 
in the exact sciences it attains its minimum and in the 
sphere of the formal it hits zero. Consequently it ie a 
meaningless and a useless application of the adjective to 
speak of a "Christian• mathematics. On the other hand, it 
is extremely important and absolutely essential to speak of 
•Christian• conceptions of freedom, the good, community, 
and st.~11 mo~e of God. In each of the above cases cited 
110hristian" suggests the manner in which the rational know-
ledge in these fields is to be corrected by the Christian 
faith, but the degree of that correction varies proportion-
ately. In the example of God it ceases to be a correction 
altogether and becomes an absolute substitution of revela-
tion for reason, while in the case of mathematics (the for-
mal) the correction disappears. completely.23 This •1aw 
of the closeness of relation• also makes us aware of the 
aa. -1hld. 
23. ""Intbe sphere of ma.thematics this is true only 'I/hen 
one is concerned with mathematical problems pure and simple •. 
As soon as one begins investigating the iounda.tions of these 
problems, then •once again the sphere of knowledge is affected 
by the mysterious background of the whole, 11 which 1aeans God 
and sin.. !lll5i., p. 383. liore will be said about this in-
dispennable observation when we criticize Brunner•s position. 
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existence of several problems ~hich lie amid\78.Y," in which 
p•.irely rational knowledge and faith interpenetrGte and even 
cooperate, as, for e:zn;i1ple, in the spheres of ll .. v1 1 the State. 
histo1·y, time, et ceter&... There is no "Christian science of 
la':!'1" in the same sense tha.t there is a 11 Cbz istian theology.• 
Yet because law involves justice and juctice is inceparable 
from the Just end therefore a.lso :from the theologica.l idea 
of divine justice, one cannot escape tile influence of revela-
tion in this midw&y sphere. Aga.ip, howe,rer, the more formal 
tlle thinking of the jurist the less w-111 111s conclusions be 
affected by revelation, and the less will be the difference 
between the Christian and the non-Christian juristic con-
clusions. RcLt1.ono.l imot1ledge neods modification only to the 
extent and degree that it is concerned with human beings as· 
responsible persons. •In other words, the more we are con-
cerned ~1th the world, n·the world, the more autonomous is 
the reason; but the more •;te are concerned wi tll the ,.,orld as 
God's Creation, the less autonomy is left to reason.n24 
Emil Brunner has almost f~o111 tho beginning of bls ca-
reer 'been in,restiga.ting th,~ relation bet,veen reveli:.tiou and 
reaoon, and the role thQt the Christian must play in culture 
and the ·:rorld. Upon becoming priva.tdozent a.t the University 
of Zurich in 1923, he issued The Limits .Q!.Hwnanitv. It con-
tained the rudi1ne11ts.ry outline of the ~ffini ty between reason 
and revelation, and it grounded culture in the transcendent 
24. l!llJ!• • P• 384 
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sphere of God. !h!. Philoeouhv of ReliP:ion (1927) continued 
from there allowing even a Chr-ietian philosophy of religion 
in a secondary, limited sense·. J. ore important to our theme 
iE the embyro of the Christian philoso,,he:r \'Illich tr e find 
taking ehape in the conclusion of the volume: 
But, as faith is not sight, and as in feith we 
only overcome the contradiction that trammels hu-
man existence if at the same time we endure it, if 
we persist in it •in the body•, for this reason the 
believer does not withdraw from~ rational life that 
aims at knowledge and culture. He takes hie part 
in then!, the:, furnish the material of the activity 
by which he has to prove himself an
5
a Christian, 
a member of the ecclesia milit&ns. 
In The ~ediator tbe embyronlc Christian philosopher con-
tinues his slow, steady growth. He makes uite an impreti-
sion already in the last chapter of the work tvhere Brunner 
di&cusses the laym~n in Christian action. The actual birth 
of the Christian philosopher takes place in~ Divine .!m.-
nerative (1932) in conjunction with Brunner•s primal use 
of the "la,, of the closeness o~ relation. 11 This la:, ,1ent 
by a slightly different na:!le tb~n: the law of the ''personal 
centre. 1126 The Professor of Zurich employed it in this 
volume on ethics to solve the enigma of the Christian's 
participa tion in the State, in culture, science, education 
and in church polity. The next major work of Brunner•s, 
~.!n,Revolt (1937), viewed the law of the •persQnal centre• 
as. Emil Brunner,:!!!!. Philosophy 2t Religion, p. 190. 
26. Of. Emil Brunner, I!!!l Divine Imoeratiwe, pp. 490, 
495f, 506, and 54?. 
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as applied to one particular area; namely, Christian anthro--
pology. In this ~phere the Christian philo•opher discovers 
a wide interpenetration of reason and revelation, hence both 
are valid and must cooperate. 
The Christian doctrine of man maintains that, 
although it understands man jrom the point of 
view of the truths of revelation, which are ~t 
accessible to experience, yet it does not in any 
way contradict what can be known of man in and 
through experience; on the contrary, it incor-
porates this knowledm1
7
gained by e·xperience· into 
its rightful context;.:J 
Once again the relation between revelation and exp~rience, 
or reason, works itself out when t .h~ law of the apersonal 
centre" is brought into proper focus. 
The more closely we are concerned with the 
centre, with man's personal relation ~\th God 
and man's personal being, the greater will be 
the infiuence of unbelief upon the higher life 
of mind and spirit. T-~e further we move away 
from this central point the less evident does 
it become·, and it is therefore still more dif-
ficult to rec.ognize it. If a person studies 
anatomy or physics it will be impossible to 
tell from his scientific work, pure and simple, 
whether he is a Christian or an unbeliever. 
But hi°a faith or his unbelief will come out 
ve~y clearly in his way of thought and life as 
a man.28 
I-t wasn• t u,ntil the appearance of Revelation and Reason . 
(1941) that the Christian philosop~er reached the real 
age of discretion. in Brunner•s development of him. In 
this work the Christian philosopher's role is made ob-
ligatory and inescapable. At the same time bis role is 
27. Emil Brunner, ~ in, Revolt. p. 61 a~.~-. p.· ass. 
made less perilous by a detailed presentation of the •1aw 
of the closeness of relation• ~or solving the difficult 
boundary problem between the Christian philosopher's two 
i • realms: revelation and reason. 
Having now received a basic picture of the growth of 
Brunner's 'iaw of the closeness of relation,• let us return 
to the beginnings of the law as found in his book on ethics 
and the orders, The Divine Imperative. Although Brunner 
hadn't fully developed the law then and hadn't even given 
it its present day appellation, yet his application of it 
to the orders is so skillful, revealin~ and meaningful that 
we dare not overlook it. First, we shall see how the law 
comes to be .applied in the Christian's relation to the State; 
and secondly, how it must be applied in the area of culture. 
The attitude of th~ Christian to the Btate. 29 must 
always be Januslike for the. simple reason that the Christ-
ian belongs both to the State and to the Kingdom of God. 
"The St~te in its reality has always been and will always be 
basically organized selfishness. It is furthermore absolute-
ly supreme in its own sphere, but the alluring temptation is 
ever present t o make itself absolute and sovereign in the 
ultimate, religious sense of the word. When it does that, 
then the Christian must oppose it in obedience to the Bibli-
cal injunction: •we must obey God rather than man.•30 Thus 
29. Of. Emil Brunner, .tu. Divine Imperative. pp. 4~82. 
30. Acts 5:39. 
■ 
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already the relative character of the State is perceived. 
Even though the Christian cannot say •yea• to the sinful, 
selfish and secular methods which •this greedy and daerraonic 
monster•31 has always employed and will always employ .for 
increasing its power, yet •it is equally impossible for the 
Christian to say 'Ro' to the State.•32 Why? because the 
State is first a gift of God;, secondly,. a necessary protec-
tion against the unrighteousness of both unbelievers and be-
lievers; and thirdly, an essential part of our calling in 
rendering service to our fellow man. 
As much as the Christian would sometimes desire it, 
he cannot expect the State to be governed in accordance 
with the law of love. That would do away with the funda-
mental meaning of the State, for the meaning of the State is 
power. Love and justice can at best be only regulative prin-
ciples, not constitutive principles, for the reason that no 
State has ever sprung from the principles of justice or love. 
•The State is primarily not a moral institution but an ir-
rational product of history; the Christian State never has 
existed and never will. Where the State is concerned ethics 
always lag behind.n33 At the same time, though not primarily, 
the State must incorporate the just for its own health's sake 
and for the moral energy of its people. "A brutal will to 
31. Emil Brunner, .sm, • .£li., p. 461. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid. , 463 
, . 
power la bad stateamanahip.•34 Ohriatianity makes its de-
but at this point a.a an influence in regulative justice. 
It is the Christian's duty then to oppose equally both 
errors· in the sphere of the State: First, the •quietiatic 
conservatism• which ·emphasizes the autonomy of the State to 
such an extent that it denies that Christian influence has 
any v'1.ue in it. Second, the •sentimental radicalism• (Tol-
stoy) which desires to overcome the State completely by 
faith or reject the State altogether. To what extent should 
the Christian bring his influence to bear avoiding both of 
these extremes? That depends on the law of the •personal 
centre." •Here, too, the law will hold good, that the fur-
ther the particular sphere is from the. personal centre the 
less can be the influence of this regulative principle.•35 
The Christian's influence will reach zero in the purely for-
mal juridicial questions; -the less difference is there be-
tween 'Christian• and •non-Christian• ••• • • 36 Also, for the 
same reason, as Brunner clearly states in Justice !:.!!Si the 
Social Order, 37 in the matter of justice in the social and 
economic order of the State, Christian thinkers have found 
it to their great advantage to sit obediently at the feet of 
philosophers and pagan jurists. Justice is a quality in-
herent in all men. It is a characteristic instilled by an 
34. Ibid., 464. 
35. Ibid., p. 490. 
36. Emil Brunner, Revelation gReaeon, p. 384. 
37. Emil Brunner, Justice !:!!S,. the Social Order, p. 10, 
90f. 
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order of God's Cr~ation, the State. Hence, Plato, Aristotle, 
and the Roman 3urists can and do have much of validity to 
say here. The Christian's influence is at a necessary mini-
mum in these matters of the specialist and the expert. 
But the Christian has plenty to say when the State 
approaches too closely or transgresses the sacred boundaries 
of the •personal centre,• when it tries to make itself sov-
ereign in matters religious, or wh~n it attempts to interfere 
with the Christian's service toward his fellow man. Having 
discussed the duties of the Christian toward his fellow, and 
how the State is tempted to and often does interfere with 
these duties, Brunner declares forcefully: • ••• we are called -
and who else is called if not Christians? - to raise our pro-
test against every form of absolutism and omnipotence.•38 
Thus the Christian is obligated to play the dual role of cit-
izen and Christian. The "law of the closeness of relation• 
or the "personal centre• is to tell him which he is to assume 
at any given moment, and is to define the limits of his par-
ticipation. 
This law still better adapts itself to the Ohristian's 
&ctivity in culture.39 By culture Brunner means that in-
tellectual activity which is not a means to an end (as civi-
lization), but a relative end in itself as science, art and 
education. In commencing it is all-important to note that 
38. bil Brunner, The Divine Impgrative, p. 463. 
39. lbid. 1 pp. 483-516. 
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culture is not the result of any Ohristia.n faitll Qr morality, 
but is the result of the "spiritual •natural impulse•. 1140 
It is a part of man's very nature bestowed upon him in the 
Creation to create culture. In giving man his reason, of 
which •God is not the enemy,•41 God gave man his formal 
freedom. 1 Thia freedom lives in every re.tional act, whetber 
in the creation of the artist, in the thought of the scien-
tist, or in the activity of the educationalist.•43 It is 
between this formal freedom which man still retains and the 
material freedom which man lost in the Fall that we must al-
ways distinguish, otherwise· the relation between revelation 
and reason, between faith and culture becomes hopelessl~ 
confused. The formal freedom gives reason and culture an 
undisputed autonomy. Science, a.rt and education all must 
have their own immanent la.we. Even the theologian and every 
Christian who prays follows the independent laws of reason. 
But that ls· only part of the picture. Because of the same 
reason that God has created the reason and given it an au-
tonomy, He has also thereby limited it. Reason is and never 
can be Absolute. It can only live off the. Absolute. Man is 
incomplete in himself. He is only complete when he comes in-
to the correct relation with God. Only then do~s he reach 
the material nature of freedom. Now man can only believe 
through his reason. An animal cannot believe. But when man 
40. Ibid. 1 p. 384. 
41. Ibid • . 
42. !bid., p. 485. 
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refuses to believe, ~o respond through faith, then the rela-
tive end and relative autonomy of reason - and culture - has 
become an absolute self-end,an ~utonomy. Culture has set 
up its own God, which is plainly 8.J1 idol •. Man indulg,1a in 
the third classification of reason, philosophy, ~hich ta ez-
pressly forbidden. Sad t9 say though. since time roemorial 
culture has always worshipped. its O\Tll idol, reason. 
This is where the fundamental opposition 'between faith 
and culture takec place. The Christian is aware of the per~ 
petual sinfulness of culture, but still he c.annot withdraw from 
culture. He must have something in which to express his 
faith, and hence he must to a certain extent cooperate with 
the conditions of this sinful culture. "The Christian can-
not produce a Christian culture, any more than he can bring 
into existence a Christian State -or a Christian economic 
system.•43 Even the culture which he will help to create 
will be sinful. So while his faith cannot be a constitutive 
element in the construction of culture, it can and must cer-
tainly be a powerful regulative and critical principle. In 
so far as it is a regulative principl,; it can produce a very 
restricted "Christian• art, science and education. Again, 
0 tbe law will hold good, that the further the particular 
· sphere is from the personal centre the less can be the in-
fluence of this regulative principle. 1144 
43. Ibid., p. 489. 
44. Ibid., p. 490. 
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I11 concrete application this means -tha.t in the cultural 
sphere of science it is foolish to epeak of a Christian math-
ematics or a Ohristirm physics. However, when in sociology, 
psychology and particularly anthropology, scienc~ begins to 
investigate personality, which constitutes par-t of the "per-
sonal centre," then the adjective •Christian• will m~ke a 
great and meaningful impression. Yet here tod the autono-. 
mous elemeqt is always at the same time present. This ab-
stract scientific law gs.ins ground as it moves from the per-
sonal center, but it consistently loses ground as it approaches 
that center where the real human being is being investigated. 
Here at the persona.l center "Faith gains not merely a regu-
lative but a constitutive signiftcance.•45 In art and educa-
tion f aith and revelation plays a mor~ regulative and con-
stitutive role because both of theee are more closely related 
to the personal center. 'Art is always the child of the long-
ing for something else. n46 Education can never be separat·ed 
frorn the whole view of man and his responsibility. Even so, 
both of theoe have their autonomous, abstract rules too, 
which are not a part offaith. The Ohrist1an philosopher must 
always recognize this rightful realm of reason in art and 
education though he will be guided more by faith and revela-
-
tion 1n their development. 
Having now defined, applied and established his •1aw of 
the oloaenes& of relation,• Brunner draws two conclu,aions 
45. Ibid.·, p. 496. 
48. Ibid., p. 499. 
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town.rd achieving a solution of the prob;lem of nchr1st1a.n 
philosophy. 0 The first is that the Christian fa.1th is some-
thing entirely different from philosophy. Christian faith 
arises from the 1 peraonal encounter•47 of God and l!!!!l• 
Philosophy originates through systematic thinking controlled 
only by man. The second conclusion is that philosophy should 
not be the pr1m£lry interest of the believer. "For his pri-
mary interest is, and ought to be, •to seek tlie Kingdom of 
God and His righteouaness•.•48 But this by no means requires 
that & Christian cannot have any interest in philosophy or 
may not use or study it. "All things a.re yours. 049 "If a 
Christian may study music - which until now has never been 
disputed - then why should he not study philosophy?•50 
But while Christian faith is something primarily dif-
ferent from philosophy, yet the Christian philosopher - and 
this is important - docs not differ essentially from the 
Christian theologian. Thi~ is no because, according to Brun-
ner, 0 The break (bet ween revelation &nd reason) does not 
occur between theology and philosophy, but between theology 
and faith.•51 So the difference between the Christian phil-
osopher and the Christian theologian is one only of subjeot, 
not of method. •The difference between Christian philosophy 
and Christian ~heology is therefore not one of principle, 
47. On •personal encounter• -21· last chapter of this paper, 
Ohapter IV. · 
48. Emil Br1.p1ner, Revelation and Reason, p. 384. 
49. I Corinthians S:aa. 
50-. Emil Brunner.1. !99.. R.!t• 
51. Ibid •. , p., 38~. 
58 
but it is a fluid transition.•58 Every systematic theologian 
is already philosopher and theologian in the ,same body. Be . . . 
1a a theologian in so far aa he is concerned ~1th setting 
forth the problems of the Holy Scriptures themselves, but he 
is a philosopher in so far as he deals with the problems that 
are in the background of Scriptural revelation. For example, 
a man like Karl Barth who in his Dogmatics refiects on time 
and distinguishes between i10od' s ti1ne and our time, 11 nthe . . . 
time of expectation," "the time of fulfillment" and "the 
time for revelation• is already penetrating the domain of 
philosophy. 53 This 1neans that theology is not II sacred 
science, 11 though 1 t is hallowed by the t'lord of God. "The-
ology itself is eeculu like every _other academic subject.•54 
Because of the deadening influence of orthodox tradition, 
Frotestant theology has assumed the erroneous, 0 prejudiced 
vie1"1 thca.t revela tion is revealed theology, and th&t theology 
itself is therefore a •revealed,' that is, a •sacred' 
sci.ance. 1155 This has been disasterous in so far as it has 
lead to the II sacred'' isolation of theology. •This is con-
trary to the spirit of the Reforms.tion theology, and '. it like-
wise coniliots with the 11 priesthood. of all believers." 'l'he 
Christian philosopher, the Christian jurist; philologist 
and natural scientist all should stand alongside of the 
53. Ibid., p. 390. 
53. Quoted in .1.12J.g_. 
54. l1!Jal., p. ~ 
55·. Ibid. 
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Christian theologian on equal footing. The •1aw of the close-
ness of relation• will in turn reveal the limits to whioh 
~ach might proceed. 
Since tt is between faith and theology ~hat the break 
already occurs, here the theologian as well as the Christian 
philosophizing layman must be most careful. • ••• This trans-
ition is, so to speak, to· be acoo1a1plished only at the risk 
oi' one's life. 058 FJhy? simply because fe.ith is sorileth1ng 
entirely personal. lt is t1·uth as encounter between God and 
man. On the other hand, theology and Christian philosophy 
are doctrine or thought about t!3at personal encounter. They 
a.re &.lrea.dy "truth &6 idea." For a fact, that cannot be 
_helped because we human beings are made to think in the form 
of idea~; we cannot do otherwise. But the enticing tempta-
tion 1s always before us to lose sight of the 11raith truth,• 
the •encounter t1·uth0 and see only the "idea truth. a 'l'his 
le the terrible calamity that Greek intellectualism has in-
flicted upon ecclesiastical thinking almost from the begin-
ning.57 It has resulted in C&tholocism, dead orthodoxy, 
Biblical popery and. other stifling approaches which llave 
sucked the ve.ry 11i'e blood from the Church. The Church's 
teaching and preaching has become, in many places and re-
spects, purely intellectu&.l and abstract. "The Church 
turned the revelation of the Son into the revelation of an 
56. Ibid. , P• 389. 
57. For a more extensive tre~tment of this terrible 
Greek calamity ,gt,. Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
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eternal truth 'about the Son•.•58 . In order to avoid seeing 
only ideas while he must still ever employ ideas, -the Christ-
ian philosopher ohould consta,nly return ~o the starting-
poin~, ~hich is his faith and which is· •truth as encounter• 
and not •truth as idaa.• The Professor of Zurich puts it 
well in the words: 
Christian action needs to return to the start-
ing-point continually in order that it may not 
beco:.:ae soz!leth1ng riiff erent, or cor.1ethi ng wrong. 
For always the one thing that matters is this: 
that ·ne l i ve by :fa ith, that God should be hon-
59 oured; it consists in creating room for God •••• 
The dangers that the Christian philosopher will en-
counter are indeed great, but still he must face them. He 
cannot withdraw from the world because he cannot cease to 
think. 110hristian philosophy is therefore both possible 
and necessary because as Christians we neither can nor 
should cease to thint.•60 Christian philosophy appears 
impossible only from the point of view of rationalism, not 
from the vantage point of reason. Philosophy's legitimate. 
purpose - which does not co~lict with God-given reason -
is to set in order the varieties of impressions gained by 
experience, whether they be mental, moral, artistic or re-
ligious.61 The deduction of the ~hole world from a given 
principle, which philosophy has followed since Ionic days, 
is really a usurpation by the scoundrel, rationalism. Sheer 
58. Emil Br~nner, Revela tion and Reason. p. 149. 
59. Erail Brunner, la!, Mediator, p. 816. 
60. Emil Brunner, Revel~tion ~ Rea son, p. 392. 
61 • .Qt. Brunner•s second use of reason, sunra, ·p. 38t. 
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critical thinking has shown that method to be erroneous 
time and a.ga in.62 The Christian philosopher bas been the 
most critical of all. That is as it should be because he 
is in constant communion with tha correct ground of exper-
ience by faith with tba living Cod. His f4ith ha.a set him 
free, ma.de him iraillWle to s.ny r&.tionalistic, dOE:.i1l8.tic 6-bsolu-t-
isrn, and lead his rea.aon back to its origin6.l purpose. His 
reason has at the same time been given previously unknown 
pcwr.r and alertness. 
It is true, of course, that no one becomes a 
'mathematician or an artist or a thinker of genius 
simply because he is a genuine believer. But when 
he becomes a believer powers are released which 
.he did not know he possessed before. If in Jesuft3 
Obrist 'all the treasures of wisdom are hidden,• 
the believer gains a perception which, without be-
ing an that account •genius,' pierces more deeply 
into truth, and soars~ greater heights than all 
wisdom and philosophy. 
Just how powerful faith might be, Brunner shows by declar-
ing later: "I am not so sure that the Christian faith could 
not throw light on certain problems of mathematics.•65 
Mathematics carries us back to the expert, and the ex-
pert in turn carries us back to the Christian layman who 
might be engaged in this particular area of activity. Again 
and again Brunner stresses that precisely the most beautiful 
thing about his Christian philosophy is that it gives the 
63. Cf. Drunner•s third use of reason, supra, p. 39.t. 
63. Y-colossians 2:3. 
64. Emil Brunner, ~ in Revolt, p. 343. 
65. !l!!!i• I P• 544. 
■ 
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la:x;ma.n plenty of opportunity for thinking and acting - his 
God-given right and privilege under the "priesthood of all 
believers.N For too long the Church of the Reformation has 
been burdened and hindered by the idea that the intellectual 
aspect of Christianity !l\!11 be theology. 1166 It is this mis-. 
understanding, this foul interpretation which has ~idened 
the gulf between the pastor and the layman to such a degree 
that the Church has suffered tremendously. The theologian 
uas the only pezson who ~as permitted to think as a Christ-
ian. But there soon arose many lay-questions in the realm 
or specialist and expert knowledge th ... t be could not answer.-
There were no laymen - jurists, philologists, historians, 
natural scientists, polictical scientists - who ~ere so sure 
of their Christian position and truths that they dated to 
be Christian jurists, historians and scientists, This is 
one of the outstanding reasons tzhy the Enlightenment, Ideal-
ism and Positivism could so easily conquer the universities 
during tli.e 18th a.nd 19th centuries. ii~or partly tlle same 
rec;:.son the layman has become disillusioned ,,1th the Church. 
"The contemporary Christian intends to aha.re responsibility, 
intends to give his strength to the service of the Church, 
and is disillusioned by the Church if it withholds from him 
the right of service. A Ohuroh that gives him nothing to 
do cannot satisfy hira. 1167 
66. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. "394. 
67. Eutil Brunner, l.WL Divine-Hwna.n Encounter, p. l94f. 
The catastrophic events of the past few decades have 
demoustra·ted to us once and for all tha t the Church must 
emerge .from its "fatal theological. ·1aolation. 1188 11 The 
events of our o,m da.y lla.ve a t 1a.st sllO\tD us that all cu.l-
turo need.s a. Christian found.a.tion. 11 69 The business of' es-
tablishing this toundation cannot be left to the t heologian 
alone because the Bible sim~ly does not ansrer all questions. 
-~~e need Christi&n specialists in all spheres 
of life; hence we need a Christian philosophy, 
which, from the standpoint of the Christian f a ith, 
can penetrate into the region which the theolo-
gian does not enter, because he also is only a 
specialist in a .particular sphere of knowledge, 
naraely, in that of renect1on upon divine revela-
tion. The co-ordination of the vario~a spheres 
of life is the task, not of the theologian, but 
of the philosopher. But if this co-ordination 
1s to take placa from the standpoint of the Christ-
ian faith, 'hen we need precisely a Christian 
philosophy. O· 
The proble1n of Christian philosophy is so very urgent be-
cauae there ia such a tremendous need !or the penetration . 
of all spheres of life by the Christian spi:rit. This pene-
tration will only occur when we understand that theology 
is not above Christian philosophy just as the pastor is not 
above the layman. Obrist is the head of both and 
Tl1ey both stand undor Christ, the one in an 
inner, the other in an outer, circle; the one 
with t~e t ask of understanding the message of 
Jesus Christ in its inmost depths of meaning; 
68. Emil Brunner! Revelation a.nd Rea.son, p. 395. 
89. Ibid. This v ew ot Srunner•a is the resu.lt of quite 
an evolution since the days of· The Divine Imnerative (1932)~ 
in which lle states definitely:. 1rft' is not the business of t.ne 
believer as s~ch to crwa te culturo •• Thut is the task of man 
apart rrom fa.1th •••• And agin: The Christ1an cannot pro-
duce a Christian culture •••• • p. 489. 
70. Ibid. 
and thus purifying the proclamation of the Gos-
pel and ever anew basing it on the Word of reve-
lation; the other with the task of making clear 
the truth offaith in order to throw light on 
the problems of Christian living in the world, 
and to help them1to. deal with these problems in a creative way.7 
0rit1c·1am 
The teachings, postulates and positions of Emil Brunner 
are difficult to criticize. Thia is not because he furnishes 
a perfect system that defies anything but constructive criti-
cism, far from it. It is rather because of his elusive, dia-
lectical method. As Daniel D. Williams of the University 
of Chicago analyzed the problem, •Brunner•s writing has a 
deceptive smoothness and simplicity on the surface. Under-
neath there is a dialectical restlessness and a continuous 
subtle movement.• 72 It is emctly this •dialectical rest-
lessness" that makes the final ~inning down of any single 
doctrine of Brunner•s tricky and perplexing. His mass of 
unresolved paradoxes, contradictions and seeming inconsist-
encies leave one hanging in a quandary as to his eza.ct posi-
tion. The reader is prone to take a Udialectica1• attitude 
and approach as regards him. He would never like to state 
such a definite •no• that he could not recover it with a 
"yes.• He would like to allow sufficient room to backtrack 
with the qualitive condition: •to a certain extent Brunner 
71. lllJ4., p. 396. 
72. D. D. Williams, Jm.• .£1:l. p. •241. 
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says this, to a certain extent this is true concerning him, 
that is false.• In a word, one finds it an ~duous task to 
come to a decisive conclusion without doing the Professor 
of Zurich an injustice in some way or another. 
One example to illustrate this difficulty of knowing 
just what Brunner means is his position regarding the fall 
and Cr~ation. He declares: •Heither this original reve-
lation nor original sin can be placed within the historical 
category.•73 Yet while the historical fact is gone, in the 
very neY.t breath he states that the concept·s and the truths 
of the concepts are still in v.ital force. He then conven-
iently relegates the Fall and Creation to the vague categorJ 
of "supra-history, 0 which no one I have met thus far can 
quite penetrate. We a.re inclined to agree with J.P. Clel-
land who said in his review of Revelation and Reason: 
These are all limiting concepts and at once we 
feel ourselves drawn into the dizzy whirl of dia-
lecticism with its yea-no, true-false, black-white, 
1 tis- 1 taint, until we no longer know whether we 
are coming o~ going. God is revealed, yet He is 
hidden; the Scriptures are the Uord, yet th9l are 
not the Word; man is saved, yet he is lost. 
Another thing that makes Brunnerian principles dif-
ficult to investigate thoroughly is the conspicuous lack 
of definitions of terms, particularly crucial terms like 
reason and philosophy. Daniel Williams speaks again: 
73. Emil Brunner, Reveiation and Reason, p. 264. 
74. John P. Clelland, Review of Brwmer•s Revelation 
g Reason,• in l:.l!!, weytminater Theological Journal, Vol x, 
Ro. l, (Dovember, 1947, p. 61. 
' 
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• ••• he never defines these terms. To be sure, he gives 
many quasi-definitionai but he never says: 'Here is ezaotly 
the sense in which I mean to use these words• .• •75 Brunner•a 
approach is mainly what is called the •typological.• He 
gives a host of illustrations, examples and contrasts and 
let's it to the reader to be able to see the clear meaning 
of a term sitting out by itself. 'l'his method becomes quite 
confusing sometimes, and it puts Brunner in a position that 
leaves him vulner~ble to-misunderstanding. 
On the other hand, to say that Dr. Brunner is not one 
of the greatest writers, thinkers and. theologians of our 
an 
day is to do him/injustice. His living, popular tomes are 
loaded with penetrating, stimulating and inspiring thought. 
Emil Brunner•a influence is already measured in deoadea 
and ~111 continue to be so computed. His prime purpose to 
awaken a more living Christianity, to arouse a more influ-
ential Christianity in every sphere of human activity is 
most laudable. lels F. S. Ferr6 sums it all up well in his 
I 
resume of Revelation .!D!iReaaon: 
To me he (Brunner) is one of the most all 
around Christian writers of our time •••• lly 
settled opinion is that though Brunner hardly 
has all it takes to meet our modern problems, 
yet he bas so much to say of critical importance 
and wise insight, that for any alert thinker 
to miss reading him is a distinct misfortuna.76 
75. Daniel D. Williams, .sm, • .£U., p. 243 
76. Nels r. s. Ferr~, •Book Review on Brunner•s Revelation 
!:ml Reason,• in 'l'heologv Tod.av, Vol. IV, No. 1, (April, 1947), 
p. 143. 
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It is our conviction that there is muoh to be ·learned 
from Dr. Brunner's inquiry into the age ol~ problem of the 
relationship between reason and revelation and hie Christ-
ian philosophy that grows therofrom. 
Even though the world is sinful, even though a per-
petual Ar mageddon has arisen between reason and revelation 
because of the sinfulness of the world, yet the Christian 
cannot wi thdra\Y from the world. He cannot ,1.1 thdraff from his 
own reason. Positively, the more earnestly and diligently 
the Christian plays his role in the world the ·more will this 
evil world be held in check. Certainly the spirit of Christ 
and the Hew Testament is in contradiction to any withdrawal. 
from the world and any ascetic denial of the world in the 
vein of St. An1fhony of Simon the Stylite. St. Paul writes: 
•1or ev.ery creature (better. ·• creation 1 ) . of God is good, and. 
nothing to be refused,•77 "Unto the pure all things are 
puren78 and •All. things are yours, 079 Such passages pre-
clude any ascetic denial. Rather they give the Ohris-tie.n 
a positive, free and activistid position in society'. Thia 
position in society im~oses on the Christian the use of· his 
God-given reason. •Replenish the eµth an~ subdue it,• cer-
tainly presupposes the. use of the mind and reason. ~ithout 
it man could subdue nothing and would be on the same plane 
with the animals. 
77. J iimothy' 4:4. 
78. Titus 1:1.5. 
79. I Oorintniana 3:~l. 
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It is almost too trite to repeat - but possibly because 
of its triteness it is often overlooked - that the explana-
tion to the First Article; recorded three times in our Con-
fessions, recognizes reason as God-given. •I believe ••• 
that he has given me my body ,and soul •· .. my reason, and all 
my senses •••• •80 Luther, the author of these words, re-
garded reason to be the gi(t of God even though he allowed 
no place for reason in matters spiritual. He declares: 
"Therefore the attempt to establish or defend divine order 
with human reason, unless that reason has previously been 
established and enlightened by faith, is just as futile as 
if I would throw light upon the sun with a 11ghtless lantern, 
or rest a rock on a reed.•81 But the mat ter was wholly dif-
ferent after reason has b·een enlightened by faith. Luthezi•·s 
reply to Dr. Henning on this matter is •well known: • ••• but 
in the hands of those who believe, 'tis an excellent instru-
ment. All faculties and gifts are pernicious, exercised by 
the impious; but most salutary when possessed by godly per-
sons.N82 Perhaps Luther paid his greatest compliment to 
reason when in the critical hour of Christendom he declared: 
uun1ess I am proved to be wrong (convictus fuero) by the 
witness of Scripture or by evident reasons (ratione evidente), 
••• I neither can nor will make any retraction •••• •B3 
80. Concordia RiiglHf· pp. 532,21 681,3; 871,38. 
Bl. Luther Ho man tion Vol. 1, p. 346. 
ea. The Ta~le Talk of Mart!n Luther, trans. William 
Hazli tt:--E'sq. , p. 4t:" -
83. Luthert W. A. VII, p. 838, ~oted in Emil Brunner, 
Revelation J!!!Sl.Reason, p. 380. 
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In accord with this utterance Luther was not of the opinion 
that men might not knon or study philosophy. •I don't say 
that men may not teach and learn philosophy; I approve there-
of, so t~at 1t be w:ithin reason and moderati.on.•84 Though 
Luther hated scholastic Aristotelian metaphysics with an 
intense hatred yet he stated that he would like to see the 
Stagirite1 s books on Logic, Rhetoric and Politics retained 
for use in teaching and preaohing.85 This statement i~ 
closely akin to arunner•a previously cited position86 that 
in some matters, politics fo~ example, the Christian thinker 




The Lutheran or~hodox dogmaticians have never contested 
the ministerial use of reason (usus rationis ministerialis, 
organicus) as the means by which man perceives and thinks. 
"Reason in this sense has a legitimate and necessary place 
in theology, since the Holy Spirit implants and preserves . 
saving faith through the Word of God which is received into 
the human mind. 187 To this ministerial use of reason is 
added the study of languages and particularly the use of 
grammar and logic •because the Holy Spirit was pleased to 
accommodate uimself to the laws of human thought and 
speech. 188 
84. ll!!, Table I!1Js. .2f. Martin Luther, p. 37. 
85. Luther, Holman Edition, Vol. II, p. 147. 
86 • .Q!. aunra, p. 17 .• 
87. John T. ~ueller, Christian Domnatics, p. 92. 
88. Ibid. · 
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The Lutheran theologians then raised the question: •Ia 
reason and philosophy altogether opposed to faith and the-
ology?• Their answer was no. Faith and theology are for 
them mereiy above legitimate reason. But they are contrary 
to the arbitrary, corrupt and perverted reason. ~uenstedt: 
"Philosophy and the principles of Reason are not contrary 
to Theology, nor the latter to the former.•89 And Gerhard: 
"In themselves considered, there is no contrariety, no con-
tradiction between Philosophy and Theology~ because what-
ever things concerning the deepest mystery of~aith Theology 
propounds from revelation, these a wiser and sincere Philos-
ophy knows are not to be discussed and estimated according 
to the principles of reason, lest there be a confusion of 
wh~t pertains to entirely different departmenta.•90 Only 
when reason leaves its banks and overflows into the private 
field of revelation must it be condemned, as ~uenstedt states 
again: uTheology does not condemn the use of Reason, but 
its abuse and its affectation of directorship, or its magis-
terial use, a.a normative and decisive in divine thiims.•91 
~n complete accordance therewith our Lutheran dogrnaticians 
never depreciated the proper use of philosophy, but condoned 
it as having value even for the theologi&n, though in a very 
restricted sense. Its value vas felt when the theologian 
89. Heinrich Schmid. la!, Doctrinal Theology: .2!. the !!!m-
gel igal Lutheran Church, trans. Hay and Jacobs, p. 32. 
90. ~-, p. 33. 
91. Ibid., p. 35. 
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ap·proached the so-called •mixed• articles of Holy SQripture, 
truths which could be known also somewhat by reason. In re-
gard to them Quenstedt says: •In the mixed articles we grant 
that philosophical pr1nci,ples ma.y be employed; not, indeed, 
for the purpose of decision or demonstration, but merely 
for illustration, or as a sort of a secondary proof of that 
which has already been decided by the Scriptures.n92 Gerhard 
adds thereto: "In this latter manner the Theologian becomes 
indebted, for some things·, to the philosopher • • • • •93 Thus 
we see here also that the theologian cannot escape dealing 
with the problem of philosophy and theology, or reason and. 
revelation no matter how fnndamen~al and devoted a Bible 
student he might be. It is a question he is forced to face 
even though manyc:a.lamitous•perversions have resulted in these 
two area~ when subtle philosophy broke from its reins and 
overran theology. Thus far we are, therefore, in almost per-
fect harmony with the principles as set forth by Dr. Brunner. 
ahen our theologians distinguished "mixed" articles 
from "pure0 articles, they were in effect saying that there 
are some articles which are not a.a closely related to the 
absolute center of God and ntan and revela tion. a s others. 
In the "pure" articles man could only know through revela-
tion and reason could never be valid. Yet in the umixed• 
articles reason could be valid too in a restr~cted sense 
92 • .!!!!!!-, p. 37f. 
93. Ibid. , p. 37. 
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because man could know in part by his God-given reason~ .Of 
course, they were most careful to repeat that just because 
the "mixed" articles had some validity before t he bu of 
reason was not the cause for the Ohristian•s believing them. 
His cause for believing them was simply Scriptural revela-
tion. Still and all, certainly the doctrine of salvation 
by faith in the atoning Jesus Christ is more closely re-
lated to the center - it is the center of Scriptural teach-
ing regarding a man's salvation - than the doctrine of the 
natural knowledge of God, which any Aristotelian, Hindu or 
Hottentot can know, though not perfectly, through his natu-
ral reason. There is a sort of a "law of the closeness of 
relation" even in' theology. Whether or not there ia much 
value in employing such terminology in this area is another 
question. 
But the •1aw of the closeness of relation" does have 
value when the Christian layman finds himself face to face 
with problems and questions concerning which there is no 
answer in Scripture. Our sanctified common sense already 
tells us that in such matters as pure ma.thematics, logic, 
architectural drawing and some related subjects the Bible 
has little to say. In these fields the Christian will have 
more •freedom" than in the pursuit of activities like psy-
chology, sociology, anthropology or their kin. Furthermore, 
in the former his thinking pure and simple will differ 
little or none from the non-Christian's thinking, while in 
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the latter his thinking will necessarily differ vastly from 
the unbeliever's. Psychology, sociology and anthropology 
nearly always suggest definite ethical implications and in-
junctions. The true Christian can never escape facing e. 
Scriptural judgment on any system or suggestion or natural-
istic ethics. The u1aw of the closeness of relationn ie val-
uable in so far as it gives the Christian a helpful tool 
with which he can work in measuring wherein and how far he 
must differ from his unbelieving associates in study and 
research. The result will be, let us say, no 8 0hriatian• 
formal ma.thematics, but will certainly be a. Christian study 
of man or anthropology. Whether or not the Christian anthro-
pologist noi:1 wishes to call himself a "Christian philosopher• 
rests entirely with him. !21_ p;uetibue non .ill dlsnutanduml 
~vith Brunner the designation 11 0hristie.n philosopher" ls a 
very fluid, non-frightening and arbitrary term. Brunner be-
gins to apply it to the Christian as soon as the Christian 
embarks upon thought or action outside of the strictly for-
mal sphere of logical thougllt perception or commo.n sense. 
In other \vords, for him the Christian jurist who thinks 
about pol itical or social justice is already a Christian 
philosopher. 
e heartily agree with Dr. Brunner that the Christian 
layman ought to take a most active part in whatever secular 
calling he happens to o~oose. He ought to make his Christ-
ianity kno'YD and felt in his particular calling too. He 
■ 
ought surely to differ from his non-Christian associate in 
so far as a difference is possible and necessary. That is 
to say, a difference is hardly possible in purel7 formal 
geometry, but it is certainly necessary in anthropology. 
To the extent that the Christian working in anthropology 
must differ from his non-Christian partner, he must develop 
his own system of anthropology which does not conflict with 
Scriptural revelation in any case or point. Thia is not 
to say that everything in his system will be directly de-
fined by Scripture. Scripture does not and was not made 
to ansver every question abo~t the study of man and his move-
ments. 
This "law of the closeness of relation" can, however, 
easily mislead. It can induce the. Christian who hap,pe~ to 
be a mathematician into believing that since he is moving a-
bout on the outer periphery, he need not concern himself 
with the center at all. While his disconcern is possible 
with regard to the purelv formal aspect of his interest, it 
is definitely not possible in the material aspect. The ma-
terial aspect rises into prominence when the mathematician 
views the whole mysterious background of his. subject or 
takes into consideration motives and desires. The familiar 
story about Albert Einstein well illustrates the "mysteri-
ous background• of even a formal subject as mathematics. 
After Einstein has filled his fourth or fifth blackboard 
with intricate formulae and elaborate equations in search 
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for some unknown, he begins to mutter: nue•s UDC&DDJ' J He's 
uncannyJN Brunner likewise acknowledges: "Even the simplest 
atom of hydrogen has its •metaphysical background,' as in-
deed, all and each have ita definite place in the whole plan 
of the Creator and Redeemer.•94 And from the point of view 
of motives the Christian differs most widely from his non-
Christian associate. The Christian promotes the glory of 
God and the welfare of his fellow man. The non-Christian 
may have the service of his fellow brother in mind, but he 
altogether lacks that motivating fear and love of God. The 
crucial question arises: Oan motives ever be separated 
from thinking or acting? We doubt if any separation ezists 
beyond. the 01ind. We believe that in actual practice mot-ives 
cannot be separated from actions. ~"ven the Christian judge 
will be impelled by a different rnotive than the non-Christ-
ian. ~e firmly believe furthermore that in nis enthusiasm 
over his discovery Brunner sometimes loses sight of this 
significant factor of motives. Still the distinction be-
tween the formal and the material, and the a1aw of the close-
ness of relationN that grows out of this distinction, is 
both valid and necessary. It is ·as valid as our distinction 
between justification and sanctification. It is as necessary 
as the Christian's duty to engage in secular pursuits. If 
.there were no formal side to mathematics, jurisprudence, 
94. Emil Brunner, Revelation .!!!S1 Reason, p. 382. 
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business, mechanics and similar areas of human interest then 
every Christian \VOUld have to become a her1ni t. He could not 
be a "salt11 or a 11light.• 
Where we do differ wholly from and draw a eharp lino 
of contention with Brunner though, is where he states: 
The break (between revelation and reason) does 
not occur bet\veen theolo·gy and philosophy, but be-
tween theology and faith. That transposition of 
the encounter of faith - of that conversation be-
tween God who addresses man and the ma.n who re-
sponds - is accomplished already in the doctrine 
of the Church by the transition from the sphere 
of the personal into that of the idea. 'Think-
ing it over' is tlle beginning of the prQcess 
that wi~5 be carried farther by a Christian phil-osophy. 
On the immediate surface this does not appear so bad, be-
cause, true! the theologian is required to "think" even as 
any jurist or artist- Furthermore, we agree that theology 
is not the same as faith because a person may be a master 
theologian and atill r.1.ot have f'a.ith. But because this seem-
ing inconsista.ncy is possible does not mean that now the 
break between revelation and reason must come somewhere lz!!-
~ theology and philosophy. The Dible tells us time and 
time again that man can and does resist the workings of the 
Holy Spir 1 t through the riord. Indeed, of himself man can-
not do otherwise. i·:hy tlien some are converted and others 
are not, is an enigmatic question that the Bible leaves un-
answered, and so do we. Brunner tries vainly to answer this 
95. ,ills., p. 389. 
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UJJ,8.Dswer~blo question by placing the break be.tween revela-
tion and reason al~eady between faith and theol~gy: between 
•the personal encounter .of God and man° and •the thinking 
over" of thie encounter by ma.n .. Not only does he fail to 
arrive at a satisfactory solution to the problem, but at 
the same time he commits the gross error of stating: ''the 
break does not occ~ between theology and philoaophy. 1196 
Between theology and philosophy is precisely llhere the break 
occurs! Theology is on all a.ides closely bounded; limited 
and guarded by the Holy Scriptures. As soon as theology 
goes beyond Scripture in substance or in thought it ceases 
to be Christian and Bibliqal theology, for, as ~enstedt 
declares: "The sole, _proper, adequate, and ordina.ry aource 
of Theology and of the Christian Religion is the divine reve-
lation contained in the Holy Scriptures; or, what is the 
sa.~e thing, that the canonical Scriptures alone are the ab-
solute source of Theology, so that out ,2t !wm!, a.lone are the 
articles of faith to be deduced an4 drawn.•97 For the true, 
orthodox Christien theologian the break will ever come be-
t:-1een theology o.nd philosophy becaune Ei.s long as the trw, 
Christian theologian ts working in the field of theology he 
must abandon all philosophizing and rationalizing. He must 
not substitute his h~an rr.a.chine.tions for or essentially 
weave them into the pattern of revelation. ~ llQ!! eat 
Biblicum, non .m_ theologicum, One more pertinent statement 
98. lbJJl. 7f 97. liiUenstedt, quoted in H. Schmidt, .sm,. ill-, p. 2 • 
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by Quenstedt: •Divine revelation is tb.e first and the le.at 
source of sacred Theology, beyond ~hich the theological dis-
cussion among Ohriotians dare not proceed. ■98 
For Brunner the break between revelation and reason can 
and already doee occur ~etween faith and theology.99 It 
occurs there because he plainly violates "revelation as the 
first and last source of sacred TheoloGY, beyond which the-
ological discussion among Ohristians dare not proceed." To 
the 1ord of Revelation contained in Holy Scriptures he adds 
reason. 
Reason tells him first of all, in contradiction to clear 
passages of Scripture, that he cannot identify the Word of 
God with the entire Holy Scriptures of the Canon. Dr. Brun-
ner states: "The Scriptures are the Word of God, because, 
and .!n. eo far.!!., they give us Christ."(Underlining my ownJlOO 
Aleo, "••• Holy Scriptures; the latter has authority only. 
in so far ae it is the Word of God, not in itself, and there-
fore never as an entity which is at the disposal of theology 
98. Ibid., p. as. 
99. Our contention with Brunner ia muoh more than a petty 
argument over semantics. It involves much more than whether 
we 1aean the eame thing but disagree over the use of the word 
•philosophy• in theology. As before stat,d, •thinking it 
over," employing granunar and logic, for Brunner is already 
philosophizing. Thus far the disagreement is one only of 
words. But ~hen \"le note l a ter in our discussion that Brun-
ner challenges basic Bl~lical doctrines on the shaky foun-
dation of scientific hypotheses and metaphysical principles, 
then we see how very much more is involved, a~d vhy for him 
the break mµs t lls.ppe11 bett1een faith and theology. Theology 
has already become phi~osophy, ancl •rationalistic• philosophy 
too, not merely ugramma.tical• 01· "logioal11 philosophy. 
100. Emil Brunner, Revelation ys, Reason, p. 280. 
-
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or ecclesiastical law.NlOl We now .unclerstand why for Brun-
ner the break has to occur between faith and theology. The-
ology for him must appeal to something in addition to the 
Bible, namely, reason. 'l'he Bible has authority only .!!l..&2. 
i:Ell it is the Word of 'God. ~uoh of the Bible isn't the 
Word of God, but •ts the human, and therefore· not the infal-
lible, witness to the divine revel&tion. 11102 In theologi-
zing, consequently, one cannot employ it as an absolute law 
but must also accept with it the findings of higher criti-
cism end of science, particularly in the areas of space, 
ti1ae, and evolution. Thus, • ••• historical cri ttcism ••• 
has pointed out vurtous contradictions in the book of Acta, 
and has discovered various inconsistencies in the assign-
ment of certain definite ~ritings to well-known Apostles as 
their authors. 11103 Darwinianis·m, iihioh demonstrates the old 
orthodox view of the Creation, the historical Paradise and 
the F&ll to be untenable, • ••• has become scientif-ic truth, 
with which all honest theology has to come to terms •••• n104 
Furthermore, •the doctrinal differences of the Old Testament 
are great; the contradictions seem to mock all efforts to 
gain a unified view. Indeed, anyone who tried to make & 
scientific unity of view out of all these different and 
101. Emil Brunner, ~!!!.Revolt p. 295. 
102. Emil Brunner, Revelation and ReaEop, p. 376. 
103. Ibid., p. 285. 
104. Ib1~. 1 p. 279. 
contrnd1ctory elen1ents would only knock his head against a 
·,vall. nl05 . 
For Brunner the break must take place between f&ith 
and theolo~ bece.uue the theologian to be fit must be aao:re 
than an intelligent, believing Ohristian. He must be anthro-
pologist, scientist, sociologist, archeologist, jurist ~nd 
philosopher combined. The expert in all these fielc.eis 
competent to eit in judgment on Biblioel revelation in de-
, 
ciding what 1s the actual Word of God. The findinga"in these 
fielde are furthermore to be woven into any theological sys-
tem. 
The dismal truth is that the findings in these fields 
a1·e too oft an the produc ta of mortal reason. They are often 
f a l l ible humr.n hypotheoes and speculations as history has 
repea tedly shown. 1'hese "scientific'' findings ca.n be read-
ily mistaken. But even this fact does not perturb Brunner 
too greatly beoauae for llim theology rnust e.l\18.ys remain pli-
able anrl subject to change. It must never become dogrna.tio 
or literalistic. Indeed, th\s \Vc:s the basic fa.ult of the 
old orthodoxy. And it failed so miserably because it could 
not adjust itself to the orltical, rationalistic and scien-
tific findings of the Imlightenment. Dr. Brunner declares: 
n ••• in Protestantism everything was staked on the Bible, 
and ~ithin Orthodoxy upon the legal authority ~f the actual 
letter of Scripture. Hence when this foundation was destroyed, 
105. Ibid., p. 29lt. 
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the whole building began to totter. ■108 •'l'his was caused 
by the EnlighteDDJent.•107 
According to Brunner's rule no eystem of dogma.tics oan 
be a. final statement of faith a.nd religioue truth. Its pre-
viously stated, it is the task of the the~lo~ian to make 
dogmatics "a mediator ln between worldly scienQe and supra-
worldly testimony of falth. 11108 The carrying throu~h of 
this principle out to its logical; consistent conolusions 
and i mplica tione will by sheer neceeEity demand a break be-
tween faith and theology. The boundaries of theology have 
already been v,iped out by the encroachment of human reason. 
Theolog11 has bec01ne philosophy. Brunner therefore concludes: 
11 Tlle difference bet\veen Christian philosophy and Christian 
theolog,1 is therefore not one of principle, but is e1o fluid 
transition.•109 
Our second main objection to the theology of h}nil Brun-
ner invQlves his dialectical approach. In investigating 
Drunner•s dialectical epproaoh one discovers further evi-
dence as to uhy it is essential for him to declare the break 
be t,,,e.en fa.i th and theology. The dialectical a1,proe.oh to 
theolOg'/ introduces a foreign element into theology, na..~ely, 
philosophy. For Brunner this approach is inescapable tor 
apprehending tbe truths of revelation and must always be 
106. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, p. 105. 
107. ro1d.., p 34. 
108. Emil Brunner, Ra Ohr1stliohe Lehre !2n Gott, p. 11, 
quoted in Dale lioody, .sm_ • .£11., p. 328. 
109. Emil Brunner, Revelation ms.Reason, p. 390. 
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employed. •It ia only ~Y means of the contradiction that 
we can apprehend the contradictory ~ruth that the eternal 
God enters time •••• ■llO We would never deny that the dia-
lectic does have its value in logic and thinking, even as 
the Hegelian synthesis has its value, but we strongly pro-
test against its employment in theology as a kind of a sup-
port and buttress. The dialeoticians, including Brunner, 
have made the dialectic a pivotal point in their whole the-
ology, and Scriptural authority has suffered greatly because 
of it. As Dr. 'l'h. Engelder puts it: •They do say that their 
sole authority is the Word of God; but if we ask them why 
they are then filling their books with the metaphysical dis-
cussions of the law of the dialectic, they will have to 
answer that they do it for the purpose of establishing or 
at least strenghtening their theology. ■lll 
Luther said,and every Christian will agree with him, 
~hat Scriptural t~uth contains~ unres~lved paradoxes. 
One of the foremost is the paradox of the Law and the Gos-
pel, the apprehension of which, as Luther plainly sa'id, re-
quires a very skilled •dialeotician.• But that does not 
mean that our whole approach to the Bible must be dialecti-
cal. It is ~ot by the sheer force .2t!hl. dialeotio that we 
believe Scriptural doctrine. But this is precisely what the 
dialectician proposes. Where there is sin, there must be 
110. Emil Brunner, la@. Word .!J!!i the World, p. a, quoted 
in Theodore Engelder, .22, • .£U., p. aso. 
111. Th. Engelder, .sm, • .21t,., P.• 250. 
graoe. Ylhere · there is Qod as veiled, there must be God as 
revealed. And where there is death, there must be resurrec-
tion. These truths hold good not so much 'because clear pas-
sages of Scripture teaoh them,. but because the law of the 
dialectic demands them. There cannot be one without the 
other. There can never be so decisive a •no• that it does 
not harbor the possibility of a •yes.• Thia approach we plain-
ly term p~iloaophical. The Bible indeed says that where sin 
abounded grace did much more abound. But this truth exists 
not because any law of the dialectic demands it, but purely 
because God has so revealed it. Sin in itself does not pre-
suppose grace. 
It is possible to cite many examples of how Brunner em-
ploys the dialectic to prove or at least bolster up Scrip-
tural truths. Here we have room for only one. 
From this conception (ainner)F however, there 
springs a remarkable dialectic, very characteris-
tic of the Bible. This negation; sin, presupposes 
a positive element, of which it is the negation. 
••• Sin always has a history behind it. It means 
turning away; it is a break with the originally 
positive element. Turning away from God presup-
poses an original positive relation with God, and 
thus an original revelation •••• Thus the revela-
tion that is given to the sinner is not the first 
one; it presupposes a previous revelation apart 
from which man could not be a sinner.112 
~e abhor ~11 this precarious indulgence in the confusing 
logic of the dialectic to prove that man was once at one 
with God, then fell and is now a sinner. How muoh more 
112. Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 25f. 
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authoritative and leas bewildering to use the simple SorlP-
tural stor~ of the Creation, the Fall and the Ourse of man 
as told in Genesis I and II .• 
Just how preoar·ious Brunner• a introduction of the dia-
lectic and other philosophical arguments into his theological 
system is, ~a demonstrated by the straightlaced philosopher, 
J. s. Bizler: 
One feels like turning Brunner's own method baok 
against him. To put the matter in the sharply al-
ternative way of which he is so fond - either Christ's 
coming was revelation, meaning by that something 
which transcends the ordinary laws of thought, or 
it was not. If it was revelation we cannot discuss 
it, or at least we cannot so confidently say what 
must and what must not have happened, for we have 
only our own ordinary thought forms to use. If it 
was not revelation it cannot be so decisively sepa-
rate from ethics and reason. But Brunner himself 
asserts that it was revelation and still goes on 
trying to convincf his readers 12.x. logic ,!ml argu-
,msm1. In ap1 te o his own statement one is thus · 
forced to believe that the transcendence of God and 
of his r~velation is coupled with at least a sutfi-
cient degree of immanent qualities 1D enable 11 ,12. 
l1!. discussed •••• •(Underlining my own)113 
In short, Brunner and the rest of the dialecticians are 
playing with fire in employing philosophic.al principles and 
arguments. They are making themselves vulnerable to abstract, 
rationalistic philosophy which Brunner tries hard to avoid. 
(Brunner•s third use of reason) because they are flirting 
with its very daughters. 
113. J. s. Bizler, •Brunner and the Theology of Crisis,• 
in The Journal ,g!Religion, Vol. IX, Ho. 3, (July, 1939) 
p. 455f. 
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III. Brunner•a Principle of •truth as Encounter• 
Thus far we have produced two major objections to Emil 
Brunner1 s view of the relation between revelation and reason 
and his idea of Christi~ philosophy. Both of these objec-
tions sprang primarily from our ma.in line of contention uith 
Brunner that the breaking.point between revelation and rea-
son occurs already between f~ith and theology. We saw, in 
the first place. that for him the break must occur there be-
cause ha allows reason to sit in judgment over revelation in 
deciding what is the Word of God. In the second place, ~e 
discussed his typical dialectic approach to\1'8.rd theology which 
again necessitates the break between faith and theology be-
cause the dialectic approach is basically a philosophical 
one. Brunner has already introduced illioit·reason and phil-
osophy into the private chamber of theology. As a result, 
his theology has become in many respects something decided-
ly different from the simple Christian faith as set forth 
by divine revelation in the Holy Oanon. 
Qur third principal objection to Brunner•s idea of 
Christian philosophy is the most vit.al of all. It enters 
where Brunner begins discussing faith as •personal encounter 
between God and man," where he asserts Christian truth to 
as 
be "truth as encounter~• Re object strongly at this point 
because Brunner here proposes theses that concern the very 
nature of faith and :revelat•ion,. These are concepts which 
even the Bible does not define. No one knows, because the 
lloly Scriptures do not tell us, what faith is in its very 
essence and how God mysteriously reveals Himself to an in-
dividual and converts him through the 'lord. Yet Brunner is 
bold enough to try to unravel this mystery with his on rea-
son. In doi~so he grossly violates his o.m laws of "the 
closeness of relation" ·and "the personal centre,• la.us on 
which his whole idea of Christian philosophy hinges. Says 
Daniel D. Williams, and we agree entirely with him: "Brun-
ner introduces a philosophical idea into his theology at 
the very point where he says it does not belong, namely, 
in the description of the encounter betNeen God and man.•l 
Dr. Brunner•s principal exposition of the •personal 
encounter" and •truth as encounter" theme is found in his 
book ls!.Divine-Human Encounter.a In this work he molds 
this theme in bright, bold relief against the dark, drab 
background that he has painted of the Greek conception of 
. . 
truth apprehended through the Object-Subject antithesis. 
He declares: 
The use of ~ Ob:leot-Sub:legt antithfte1 a 1A. un:-
derRanalii'g 'the truth 0:., faith . . . is a disaste:r-
ous misunderstanding which affects the entire content 
1. Daniel D. Williams, .sm,:.9.11., p. 251. 
a. The German title is much morre revealing. It is· pre-
cisely \'lahrheit !:l!, Begegpung, Truth .!I. Encounter. 
of Christian doctrine and also operates fatally 
in the practice of the Church, moat severely 
impairing the procl&mation of the l ord and faith 
among the fellowship. The Biblical understanding 
.2'. truth c&nnot 9.1. grasped through~ Ob:leot-
Subject antithesis: .2!!. 1b§. contrary 11 l!, falsi-
fied through .!t,.3 
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Just what is this disastrous Object-Subject antithesis? 
The Professor of Zurich employs the historical method in de-
fining these two concepts, Object and Subject. These con-
cepts assumed their basic form in the early Greek minds. The 
Sophists and Socrates a.re examples of this type of mind which 
was concerned solely with the philosophical problem of truth 
and knowledge as entities apart from being and thinking. In 
a few words, in their minds the Object as opposed to the 
Subject emerged~ Greek philosophy soon cast its deadening 
spell over Christian thought. The erroneous idea then arose 
••• that the divine revelation in the Bible had 
to do with the communication of those doctrinal 
truths which were inaocesaible by themselves to 
human reason;and correspondingly that faith con-
sisted in holding these supernaturally revealed 
doctrines for truth. 4 
The supposition of the Object-Subject antithesis has burdened 
the Church's understanding of revealed truth and determined 
, 
its practice ever since. The Church cannot seera to break 
away from this witested, unrecognized and unconscious "appli-
cation of the antithesis between Object and Subject, between 
3. Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. aof. 
4. llll!i· , p. 19. 
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the objective truth of faith (Credo) and the subjective ac-
ceptance of faith (credo). 0 5 
The over-emphasis on the Object almost immediately 
leads to two ruinous errors in the Boman Catholic Church. 
The first error of Objectivism began with the asking and , 
answering -of such questions: how long after reception does 
the consecrated Host of Christ remain in the stomach of the 
believer? Before long this entirely personal event of the 
Sacrament became an i!l'Personal, _physical-m~taphysical ob-
ject, a sort of a material medicament which is at the dis-
posal of the priest a.ny time he may choose. The second 
error of Catholic Objectiviam is of a more aubtile nature, 
though its basic purposes and tendencies are the same. It 
is concerned with the Word of God. God gave His Word to 
the Church to be proclaimed, but the power of that Uord 
comes. only from Him t -hrough the work of the Holy Spirit. 
The Catholic dogmaticians \ranted the Word as an object to 
be at thsir own disposal. The Ohurch des-ired •to be certain 
of God in a more direct way than is guaranteed through the 
promise as given to fai-th in prayer. "8 To that end the 
Church arrogat~d the authority of the ~ord to itself and 
ms.de it an object available in a mighty system of ecclesi-
astical assurances and canon law of which the Pope ia 
s. Ibid., p. ao. 





supreme hea.a.· and infallible spokesman. At his ordination, 
eve-ry priest now receives tlle Holy Spirit from the Church 
and carries it about as an object to be disposed of where 
and ~hen he oees fit. 
This Objectivism found its co1mter-pe.rt in Subjecti-
vism. 7 Subjectivism was the r eaction against the fixed, 
secure, disposable authority. Its chief characteristics 
are freedom and spontaneity. To e.ohieve its purpose, Sub-
jectivism held that the Spirit is never in any fashion 
bound to any given Word of historical fact. •only the in-
dividual can experience it (the Spirit), and only in his 
solitary experience has he the certain1ty of the divine 
revel ~tion.•8 Mysticism is the common name given to this 
individualistic enthusiasm. 
The moot beautiful and significant thing abo~t the 
Reformation is the fact that through its interpreta tion of 
the fiOrd the Church found an escape from the deadly anti-
thesis of Objeotivism-Subje·otivism. The Reformation dis-
covered the all-important •secret of moving both beti:veen 
and beyond these extremea.•9 
Its 1epistemological1 principle was the dialec-
tic; that is, its form of expression was never the 
use of one concept, but always t wo logically con-
tradictory ones: the Word of God in the Bible and 
the witness of the Holy Spirit, but these understood 
?. Object-Subject, Objectivity-Subjectivity, Objectivism-
Subjectivism are a.11 interchangeable terms in Brunner's vo-
cabulary. 
8. E~il Brunner, .sm, • .£!1., P• 28. 
9. Ibid., p. 39. 
and experienced, not as a duality, but as a 
unity.l.O 
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The truths of salvation and revelation are clearly dis-
cov~rable and available in the nord of Scripture, but they 
are never available, willy-nilly, at the Church's command 
in doctrine or dogma. Salvation and revelation are avail-
able only as the Word of the ever living Spirit of God 
through whom Obrist Incarnate takes possession of our 
hearts and dwells there. The secret of the Reformation is 
contained in uthe paradoxical unity of Word and Spirit, of 
historical revelation and God's contemporary presence, of 
'Christ for us• a-nd 10hriat in ua•. 1111 It was Luther who 
discovered. this great secret and in doing so, he refound 
the original Biblical understanding of truth. 
But this liberating purity in thecomprehension of 
Biblical truth lasted for only a short time. In the con-
troversies that inevitably followed the braak with Rome, 
the Protestant controversialists already began reverting 
back to Catholicism, though quite unconsciously. They needed 
something tangiable, fast, secure and apprehendable in their 
argumentations and so they resorted to the Word ae an author-
iative object. Before long the ~ord of God was again made 
compassable and objective doctrine became the object of 




the fitting appellation: The Age of Protea·tant Orthodoxy. 
\1hat precisely happened in this age! Brunner tells us: 
The paradoxical unity of \'lord and Spirit fell 
to pieces; the Scriptures became a gathering of 
divine oracles, the essence of divlnely r evealed 
doctrine. ~en~ God's Word •••• the tempta-
tion could not be withstood to create a system of 
assurances including the confessional dogma, the 
notion of verbal inspiration, and the Bible under-
stood as a book of revealed doctrine. The 'paper 
· Pope' stands over against the Pope in Rome; quite 
unnoticed the position of dependence on the Word 
of God is usurped by the appeal to pure doctrine, 
which in turn is made tantamount to the Word of 
God. Thia displacement Qan already be noticed in 
a decisive way in the Augsburg Confession, even 
though
1
Jtill hidden by a living understanding of 
faith. . 
A reaction to this deterioration in the understanding 
of fa ith was bound to follow. The counterstroke was termed 
simply Pietiem. It bore tlithin itself various marks of Sub-
j ectivism. Even so it was an honest effort to bring the 
individual back to the living, robust faith of the Bible. 
'l1l1e successes it accomplished in the rejuvenation of the 
Chu.rob, in social and 111issionary activities are among the 
finest recorded in the history of the Ohurch. With Schlei-
erm&cher, llo\"1ever, there began an extreme subjective inter-
pretation of faith that no longer recognized any_foundation 
for faith outside of immediate experience. This subjective 
dissolution offaith continued until lt reached lts apex 
in the American psychology of religion, so that for many 
Ia. Ibid., 3lf. 
■ 
•theologians• there was :nothing left of religion except 
a certain social feeling or value experience. 
The First ~orl4 War swept away the very foundation 
sands of this cheap, hallowed-out •theology.• Powerful 
t 
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reactionary movements which reverted back to the Bible, 
1uther and the Reformation took the stage. Perhaps the 
greatest opponent of Subjectivity in the last generation 
arose in the form of 11d1o.lect1c theology." But at the 
same time, in avoiding the Scylla of Subjectivism, maey 
began to veer too closely to the Charybdis of O~jectivism. 
In the controversies that marked the theological transi""!' 
tion period after the First world War, many a theologian 
wanted more manageable, ready-made, massive weapons to 
fight with 8 than the dialectically oscillating and organfo-
para.bolic notions in th·e Bible itself. 1113 Quite una,vares 
a neo-Orthodox. theology took shape carrying many of the 
essential features of Objectiviem, such as: over-emphasis 
on doctrine, dogma and the formulated creeds; and too much 
prominence given to the objective factor in preaching and 
in the understanding of the Church and tlle Sacraments. 
Such is the brief but grim story of how the Church has per-
sistently vascillated between the t ·,vo extremes of Subjec-
ti vism and ~bjectivism to its own great hurt and harm • 
.!la turally, upon first thought it would seem tlla t the 
solution of ibis problen1 of finding Ch1·istian truth Hould 
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lie somewhere between these two extremes. It is only a 
problem of defin-ing the proper sphere and thus simply a 
question of mediati~n. But such is decidedly not the oaseJ 
One glance o.t history, particularly the Reformation, will 
sho~ that such a compromise can at best only obscure the 
solution to the problern. Brunner defini tel1 states: "There 
is no middle vay between Objectivism and Subjectivism: 
there is no correct 1nean between two errors. ul-4 The tre-
mcmdous damage done to the Church is not the result of over-
e111phasizing either extreMe. It is rather the consequence 
of the more funda.Jnental error that the Biblical revelation 
~as brought under this antithesis at all. For: 
The Bible is as litt~e concerned uith objective 
as with subjective truth. The Objective-Subjective 
antithesis cannot be applied .to the ijord of God and 
faith. It is a category of thought wholly foreign, 
not only to the way of expression in the Bible, but 
also to the entire content.15 
:nia.t then according to Brunner is the Biblical under-
standing of truth? . It is truth as •God-truth'' apprehended 
and comprehended only in faith. 0 In faith,u says Brunner, 
nman possesses no truth except God's, and his possession 
is not of the kind whereby one ordinarily possesses a truth, 
but personal fellowship.ul8 This fellowship, of course, be-
gins when man believes God's self-revelation to man in His 
~-~ord. It starts \Vllen "an encounter takeg place between i2!1 
14. Ibid., p. 40. 
15. Ibid., P• 41. 
16. 1l2JJ1. , p. 74. 
94 
I 
.!!.!!51 man.•17 Unique Christian and Biblical truth happens at 
the mo1:ient of this encounter. It is truth so unique that 
it cannot possibly be expressed by any sort of Object-Subject 
antithesis. Its constant theme is "personal encounter• with 
God, "personal correspondence" with God. Its only analogy 
lies in the encounter between human beings ~hen one p~rson 
meets another. Here a rather lengthy quote.tion is necessary 
to understand just ~hat Brunner means by •parsonal encounter• 
and the "I-Thou relationship." 
The encounter between two h''1m&n baings is ordi-
narily not personal at all but more or leas imper-
sonal. I see 'someone.• To aee somem11,. is not es-
sentially different from seeing something. This 
someone says something to me. Someone saying •some-
thing' to me is not essentially different from my 
saying 1 something1 to myself - that is, thinking. 
But now let us put the oase that this someone does 
not say •something• but \ays' himself, discloses 
himself to rr.e, and that I, \'lhile he I says' himself 
to me, 'hear himself'; and more, that trhile he dis-
closes himself to me, and so surrenders himself to 
me, I disclose myaelf to him a.nd receive him while 
I surrender myself to him. In this rt1ome11t he ceas-
es to be for J?Ie a •someone-something' and bccomas 
a 'Thou.• In th&t moment in wllioh he becomes a 
'Thou• he ceases tq be an ::>bject of my thinking and 
transforms the Object-subject relation into a re-
lation of personal correspondence: we have fellow-
ship together.is · 
In the sa:ne way, ,1hen I stand opposite Ood and am faoe 
to face vii th Him tiho is never "something" but purely 11Thou, a 
I have nothing to reveal or disclose or think. 11He alone 
is Discloser.ul9 And he does not disclose "something" 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid., p. 85f. 
19. Ibid., p. 87. 
' 
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about Himself, that ia, mere knowledge, but He discloses 
Himself. He personally meet~ me. In personally meeting 
me my r7hole •111 exititence ie overthrown. I become com-
pletely c~nged because my "I" solitariness has been brok-
en into. I ·now have God Himself. I do not have •some-
thingH or an "object• about Go~ . As Brunner clinches it: 
"The antithesis between Object and Subject, between •some-
thing truthful' and 'knowledge of this truth' has disap-
peared and has been replaced by the purely peraonal meet-
ing bet ween the accos ting God. and answering man. 1130 
It is possible to attack Brunner and his "dl'f'ine-human 
encounter" thesis by employing various different Biblical 
approaches. This becomes increasingly evident when we note 
that his thesis a,gain leads him to deny the authority of 
the Scriptures alor, with their verbal inspiration and in-
fallibility.al It is this denial of the authority or the 
Scriptures tha.t r eP.ul t s in his semi-mystical vie?1 of the 
~Vord. Hie "divine-human encounter" theme also enduces him 
, to confuse justification and aanotifio&tion,32 and to co-
mingle Law and Gospel all &long the line.23 Furthermore, 
one might from a purety secular point of view seriously 
ques tion whether Brunner is himself consistent witll his 
. 
denial of the Object-Subject antitheeis in his unders t anding 
20. Ibid., p. 89. 
21. Qt. JJ!!.g_., pp. l ?lf. 
22 • .Q!.. ~-, pp. lOOf and 155f. 
33 • .Q!. especia.lly ibid., pp. 118f. 
■ 
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and definition of.:faith.24 
But, as before stated, our main purpose and objection 
is to show t~t Dr. Brunner has no right as a strict Christ-
ian theologian to investigate and define the very. essence 
of faith and the personal·- revelation of God to man. It is 
our purpose further to demonstrate that when he does so in 
his Divine-Human Encounter, he is already playing the dis-
tinct role of a philosopher and not of a theqlogian. Be 
is employing his third and forbidden use (-rationalistic use) 
of reason. In doing so he transgresses the very •personal 
centre• of man's existence, a ~phere in which he himself 
says that a total correction 0£ Go~ for man must take place. 
In his Foreword to lAI, Divine-Buman Encounter, Dr. Emil 
Brunner makes the bold assertion: •The Biblical conception 
of truth is: truth as encounter.•25 We wholly disagree with 
24. ~- this statement of Brunner•s in Revelation w 
Reason, p. 180f.: . • ••• the absolute union with the historic 
Mediator and the historical Word concerning Him,and with the 
act of atonement which has taken place once and for all on 
the Cross. The distinctive mark of this kind of knowledge, 
as contrasted with all other kinds of knowledge, is that it 
combines historical obiectiv1tY with a knowledge which is 
subjective and present. 
In other words; the same faith which states that 'Christ 
is in me• is also the simple faith of the Bible, faith in .2l!;-
1ective facts, in this actual Book, which I have here before 
me, and in that historical fact which once happened, at a. 
particular time and place. And, indeed, these objective facts 
are not, as they are in mysticism, merely •occasions,' or 
starting points, which we can leave behind as soon as we reach 
•reality,• the mystical experience of Christ; but faith in 
Christ is permanently a~ absolutely bound up with those 
objecJive facts, with this Book, and with this historical 
fact. (Underlining my own.) 
as. Emil Br~nner, Iwt Divine-Buman Encounter, p. ?. 
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him and stoutly maintain that the Bible never essentially 
defines ~he concept of trujh, this event of the personal rev-
elation of God to man that is faith.26 Daniel D. i illiams 
speaking about this revelation that is faith expressly de-
clares; 11 There are., indeed, many notions about revelation; 
but no definition of it.•37 Brunner must be aware of this 
himself for he states: 
Even if we brought together and analyzed exe-
getically all the Biblical passages in which the 
,vord 'truth' occurs, we should be hardly a step 
nearer our goal. Just as the Bible explicates 
no 'principle of interpretation' and contains no 
1 doctrine of the 'ilord of God,• so i18 search- it 
in vain for a 'doctrine of truth. 1 The more for-
mal a theological concept is, the less it can be 
directly discovered or validated by the Bible it-
self.as 
Yet in the very n~xt paragraph, Brunner claims the 
right to investigate and make dogma.tic statements about the 
"Biblical" under~tanding ot truth and faith. This action 
is possible because, as he mainta ins, ·these concepts of his 
••are taken f~om nothing but Scripture itself and stand in 
the closest connection to all its central contenta.•39 Tha 
situation becomes more confusing when we continue with his 
next sentence: "They (his concepts) are in fact none other 
than these very contents (of Scripture), considered in their 
formal aspect, which as such are. never directly mentioned 
as. Le·st there be some misunderstanding, :•Biblical truth• 
and faith are for Brunner one of the same. 
27. Daniel n. Williams, m!.• .£U., p. 251. 
as. Emil Brunner, .sm,. ill•, p. 45. 
29. ll!isl• t P• 46. 
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1n the Biblical word.•30 Evidently the crux for solving 
this apparent contradiction between these oonoepts not being 
8 direotly mentioned in the Biblical word,• and these con-
cepts being utaken from nothing but Scripture itself• lies 
in his' phrase: •considered in their formal aapeot." ·Still 
and all, we cannot see how this solution gives him the right 
authoritatively to project a definition of faith which is 
never warranted by Scripture. 
~here then does Emil Brunner really get his definition 
of Biblical truth and faith as the •personal encounter be-
t aeen God and ma.nu! He himself gives us a helpful hint as 
to its source when he discusses the Objective-Subjective 
antithesis as the age old criterion for discovering truth 
in general. He goes on to say: 
It was left for the newest form of philosophy, 
the existential, to question the validity of the 
antithesis itself. It is no accident that the 
source of this -new thinking is to. be found in the 
greatest -Ohristian thinker of- modern times, Soren 
Kierkegaard. It is therefore particularly sug-
gestive for us theologian~ to attach ourselves 
to this philosophy, the entire bent of which seems 
to correspond with ours.31 
Though Dr. Brunner hastly covers up by immediately asserting: 
Yet we must emphasize again that our consider-
ations are purely theological., that thence they 
are not dependent on the correctness or incorrect-
ness of that philosophical undertaking which seems 
to rj! parallel - apparently or really - to our 
own. 
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our suspicions are already quite aroused. Daniel D. Wil-
lia.ms gives us the cue that leads directly to Brunner•a 
source for truth as encounter betweon God and man when he 
states: "It comes fro)Jl a general conception of the nature 
of personal relations which has been given classic eZl)res-
sion in Martin Buber's ,lms,~.•33 Buber's philo•ophi-
cal world view rests on the distinction between two s~pa-
rate kinds of relations: those between persons, character-
ized by II I~'l'hou, " and those between things,. defined by 
"I-it.n In order to arrive at this di~tinotion, Martin 
Buber analyzed the constitutive elements in personal rela-
tions, whose distinguishing features seem to be: •the free-
dom of ea.oh person, the replacement of all objectivity by 
interpersonal subjectivity, the absence of the will to con-
trol the other, the appreciation of the other's worth as 
a personal o~jeot. 1 34 
Brunner has borrowed this pattern of encounter be-
tween person and person and applied it to the encounter 
between God and man, or in a word, applied it to faith. 
Therefore, as Daniel ijilliams points out: "'l'he event --"hioh 
ia supposed to· transcend all philosophical under.standing is 
described by the use. of a philosophical structure, drawn 
from hwnan exper.1ence- and subject to the criticism by the 
methods of philosophical analysi~.•35 Brunner is well 
33. Da.niel D. Williama, 12£. Qll. 
34. !!art in Buber, .l and 'l'hou, cited by Daniel \1illi1µDB, 
12£. ill• . 
35. leM,. 
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aware of this vulnerability to criticism. and struggles might-
ily to overcome it. He atresaes the fact that the encounter 
of person with person is only a poor analogy of the real 
thing.38 A more subtle cover-up is recognized in his re-
peated terming of Kierkegaard, ~artin Buber and his other 
creditors as · nobristiann and 1Biblical8 tbinkera.37 Here 
is one example: 
It was as a Christian philosopher that Kierk-
egaard created the 'Existential' philosophy, it 
was as a Christian thinker that Ebner discovered 
the theme of 'I-Thou• - no Greek, however great 
a genius, would have ever understood such a theme -
it was as a Biblical thinker that Martin Buber rec-
ognized the significance of the contrasts between 
1 I 1 and 1 It,• Tz• and 1 '1'hou.•3B 
Finally, however, the choice is plain. Either the the-
ologian must relinquish all investigation concerning the 
very essence of faith and his attempt to speak about it in-
tel~igibly because the Bible· speaks only of fruits and n-
sulta of faith, or he must cease to be a theologian. Only 
as a philosopher can he examine the epistemological foun-
dations and the actual originations of faith, and he can't 
do that with any authority. About these mysterious, super-
natural questions that the Bible does not answer, the hum-
ble and contrite Christian will not concern himself. He 
36. ,gt. as an example, this statement of Emil Brunner•s 
in l:a!,Divine-Human Encounter, p. 85: •Yet we are dealing 
only with an analogy seen in an exception to the usual oc-
curance •••• • -
37. le aren't discussing or questioning the Christianity 
of these men. We are only saying that their writings defi-
nitely . portray them much more as philosophers than as theo-
logians. 
38. Emil Brunner, 141!1 in Revolt, P• 546. 
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will be fully satisfied with Obrist•a injunction expressed 
time and again: "Wherefore by their fruits :,,shall know 
them. 1139 Thus we oonolude ·with 1ni ill1ams: 
••• the theologian (Brunner, of course) who has 
spent his life in an effort to free Christian the-
ology from entanglement with mysticism and with 
philosophy has in his own theology developed a 
perspective which embodies a philosophical mys-
ticism whose ~lassie ezponent is a philoso'Dher 
who does not depend on the Neg Testament.40 
For three parallel reasons then we mu&t object to the 
Brunneria.n doctrines on the relationship between revelation 
and reason and the idea of Christian philosophy that springs 
fro1n this relationship. These reasons are again: First, he 
allows reason to sit in judgement over revelation and its 
Canonical authority. Second, his whole dialectical epproach 
is philosophical. And third, his •divine-human encounter• 
principle for the 1 Biblic&l" understanding of truth and 
faith is philosophical and vio1ates his own law of the "per-
sonal centre. 11 These three reasons furthermore necessitate 
his break between revelation and reason already between 
f a ith and theology, and not between theology and philosophy 
where it properly belongs. 
There are no more fitting words to conclude this in-
vestigation of 8 Enlil Brunner and his· Idea of Ohristtan Philos-
ophy• than the almost classic ones of John P. Clelland 
39. Matthew 7:20, .sz,t. also: Matthew 7:16ff; 13:33 and 
John 15:4; 15:16. 
40. Daniel D. flilliams, loo. £11• 
102 
appearing in bis revia~ of B:runner•s Revelation and Reason: 
It is our conclusion tha t despite his desire 
to work outward from revelation to reason, Brun-, 
ner has failed to do so beoause he himself is 
a rationalist. God Almighty has spoken in the 
Sor1ptures, and in refusing to listen to His 
voice Dr. Brunner has asse~ted the autonomy of 
his reason. Iiis lea.rn1ng is ma.ssive, but oh, 
for the childlike faith of a Samuel to say, 
"Speak, Lord, for thy servant beareth. 1141 
41. John P. Olell~nd, •Review of Emil Brunner•s Reve-
lation and Reason,' in The Wet ins er Theological Jour-
nal. Vol. X, .No. 1, (November, ·1941 , P• 61. 
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